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Abstract
We consider strategy-proof mechanisms to solve allocation problems where agents
can choose outside options if they wish. Mechanisms could return an allocation or a
randomization over allocations. We prove two useful theorems, relying on an invari-
ance property of the allocations found by strategy-proof mechanisms when agents
vary the ranking of outside options in their preferences. The first theorem proves
that, among individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down ev-
ery agent’s probability of choosing outside option in every preference profile is equiv-
alent to pinning down a mechanism. The second theorem provides a sufficient condi-
tion for proving equivalence between two strategy-proof mechanisms when the num-
ber of possible allocations is finite. The two theorems provide a unified foundation
for existing results in several distinct models and imply new results in some models.
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1 Introduction
Allocation problems where agents have outside options are prevalent in real life and
economic models. In marriage markets (Gale and Shapley, 1962) men and women have
the outside option of being alone. In school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003)
children have the outside option of attending private schools. In auction markets (Vick-
rey, 1961) bidders have the outside of not bidding. To solve such problems, participation
constraints require mechanism designers to choose individually rational (IR) mechanisms,
which ensure that participants are no worse off than choosing outside options. Incentive
concerns motivate mechanism designers to choose strategy-proof mechanisms, which give
agents the right incentive to reveal true preferences. This paper demonstrates the restric-
tion of IR and strategy-proofness in the presence of outside options. We prove two simple
but useful theorems for strategy-proof mechanisms, relying on an invariance property of
the allocations found by such mechanisms when agents vary the ranking of outside op-
tions in their preferences. Applying them to several distinct models, we provide a unified
foundation for existing results and obtain new results in some models.
We present our theorems in an abstract allocation model that is proposed by Alva and
Manjunath (2019). In the model finite agents have ordinal preferences, which need not
be strict, over a set of allocations. The model is abstract because it does not specify what
allocations mean and how they are generated. It only requires that each allocation have a
well-defined set of participants; non-participants consume outside options. This model
can accommodate many environments. We consider direct revelation mechanisms that
elicit agents’ preferences and return an allocation or a randomization over allocations.
Those returning an allocation are called deterministic mechanisms, while those returning
a randomization over allocations are called random mechanisms. Randomization could
be used for different purposes in different environments. For example, in market design
randomization is often used to restore fairness. Our theorems are applicable to determin-
istic mechanisms as well as to random mechanisms. For ease of exposition, we present
our theorems for random mechanisms and regard deterministic mechanisms as special
cases. With agents’ ordinal preferences, we use (first-order) stochastic dominance tomake
welfare comparison between random allocations/mechanisms. A mechanism is strategy-
proof if, fixing the others’ preferences, when an agent misreports preferences, the found
random allocation is weakly stochastically dominated (with respect to the agent’s true
preferences) by the found random allocation when the agent reports true preferences.
When an agent varies the ranking of outside option in his preferences, a type of strate-
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gies attracting our attention is what we call contraction: an agent moves his outside option
upwards and places it immediately below an allocation that was far better than his out-
side option,1 but the upper contour set of the allocation is invariant (i.e., those weakly
better than the allocation remains weakly better than the allocation in his new prefer-
ences). A special case of contraction is known as truncation in the literature: an agent
improves the ranking of his outside option without changing preferences over the other
allocations. In a strategy-proof mechanism, if an agent contracts preferences, the total
probability mass of the allocations in the invariant upper contour set mentioned above
must be invariant. We call this property contraction-invariance. When we only consider
truncation strategies, we call the property truncation-invariance.
Our Theorem 1 proves that, if agents can arbitrarily contract preferences and never
regard allocations they participate in as indifferent with outside options, for any two IR
and strategy-proof mechanisms, comparing agents’ probabilities of being participants in
the two mechanisms is equivalent to making welfare comparison between the two mech-
anisms. If every agent has a higher probability of participating in one mechanism than
of participating in the other, then the former mechanism stochastically dominates the
latter. This result looks surprising at first glance, because intuitively comparing wel-
fare requires more information than comparing participation probabilities. But in an IR
and strategy-proof mechanism, relying on contraction-invariance, we can recover every
agent’s welfare in a preference profile from his participation probability in all possible
preference profiles where he contracts preferences. This enables us to obtain Theorem 1.
When the set of allocations in our model is finite, Theorem 2 presents a sufficient con-
dition for proving equivalence between strategy-proof mechanisms. It will be useful for
proving uniqueness of strategy-proof mechanisms among a class of desirable mechanisms
in applications. Specifically, we prove that when agents can arbitrarily contract prefer-
ences, if the random allocations found by two strategy-proof mechanisms for any pref-
erence profile are not different in the probabilities of allocations far better than agents’
outside options only if their found random allocations are welfare-equivalent, then the
two mechanisms must find welfare-equivalent random allocations for every preference
profile. This theorem relies on the finite allocations assumption, because the assumption
ensures the existence of preference profiles where there do not exist allocations far bet-
ter than agents’ outside options in their preferences. If two strategy-proof mechanisms
are welfare-equivalent in every such preference profile, then contraction-invariance will
1We say an allocation is far better than an agent’s outside option if it is above his outside option but is
not immediately above his outside option in his preferences.
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ensure that they are welfare-equivalent in every preference profile.
Before discussing applications, we clarify the relation between our theorems and Alva
and Manjunath’s (2019) (AM for short). AM prove the equivalence between Pareto dom-
inance and participation expansion for IR and strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms.
For deterministic mechanisms, stochastic dominance reduces to Pareto dominance and
agents’ participation probabilities become zero or one. So Theorem 1 extends AM’s theo-
rem from deterministic mechanisms to random mechanisms. But there are subtle differ-
ences between the foundations of AM’s theorem and ours. In our model, agents’ prefer-
ences over allocations are complete but their extended preferences over random alloca-
tions by stochastic dominance are incomplete. Somehow strategy-proofness is a stronger
restriction on deterministic mechanisms than on random mechanisms. We have to rely
on contraction-invariance to demonstrate the structure of random allocations found by
strategy-proof mechanisms. This requires us to consider variations of agents’ preferences
with invariant upper contour sets. There is no counterpart of Theorem 2 in AM’s pa-
per. We use Theorem 2 to unify the results in several models and sometimes obtain new
results. Finally, clarifying the role of contraction-invariance reveals that our theorems
hold for non-strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy contraction-invariance. In particu-
lar, our theorems hold for truncation-invariant mechanisms. In applications, some desir-
able mechanisms are naturally truncation-invariant although they are not strategy-proof.
Our model can accommodate various environments. In this paper we mainly present
applications to market design problems. In market design it is common to use direct
mechanisms to elicit agents’ ordinal preferences. The usefulness of Theorem 1 for de-
terministic mechanisms has been well demonstrated by AM. To show its usefulness for
random mechanisms, we apply Theorem 1 to the random assignment model studied by
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and many others.2 In
that model, finite indivisible objects are randomly assigned to finite agents. Theorem 1
implies that making welfare comparison between two IR and strategy-proof mechanisms
is equivalent to comparing the probability mass of objects assigned to every agent in the
two mechanisms. In particular, strategy-proof improvement can be done if and only if
by assigning more objects to every agent. Theorem 1 also suggests a property weaker
than non-wastefulness that is sufficient for a mechanism to be on the efficiency frontier
of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms. These results explain Erdil’s (2014) findings that a
necessary condition for strategy-proof improvement is to assign more objects in total to
2Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) propose the pseudo-market mechanism to elicit agents’ cardinal utili-
ties. So their setup is beyond our model, and their mechanism is not considered in this paper.
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agents, and non-wasteful mechanisms cannot be strategy-proof improved.
We use the other applications to show the usefulness of Theorem 2. In the first ap-
plication, we apply Theorem 2 to get a new result. We consider markets such as kidney
exchange and refugee resettlement where it is desirable to increase the number of assign-
ments, because being unmatched is very undesirable for agents in these markets. We ask
when it is (im)possible to replace an existing mechanism with a new one to increase the
number of assignments. We propose a criterion called size improvement. It requires that
the new mechanism should increase the number of assignments for at least one prefer-
ence profile, and when the new mechanism does not increase the number of assignments,
every agent who obtains an assignment in the existing mechanism should still obtain an
assignment in the new one. So the newmechanism respects agents’ welfare in the existing
mechanism in a very weak sense. Applying Theorem 2, we prove that size improvement
is impossible if the two mechanisms are truncation-invariant and the existing mechanism
is not too inefficient. By presenting the result for truncation-invariant mechanisms, we
intend to apply it to mechanisms in the literature that may not be strategy-proof.
In the remaining applications, we show that Theorem 2 provides a unified foundation
for the results of Hirata and Kasuya (2017) in the many-to-one matching with contracts
model (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005), a characterization result of Combe et al. (2020) in
their teacher reassignment model, and the main results of So¨nmez (1999) and Ehlers
(2018) in a generalized object assignment model. In these applications mechanisms are
deterministic. Under weak assumptions that do not ensure the existence of stable match-
ings,3 Hirata and Kasuya (2017) prove that there is at most one stable and strategy-proof
mechanism, and if the doctor-optimal stable mechanism exists, it is the only candidate.
Combe et al. (2020) propose a class of mechanisms to solve their teacher reassignment
model. In the one-to-one environment, they prove that a mechanism they recommend is
the only strategy-proof mechanism in that class. In his abstract allocation model, So¨nmez
(1999) proves that there exists an IR, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism only
if the core is essentially single-valued and the mechanism selects a core allocation when
the core is nonempty. This finding unifies the results in several distinct models, including
housing market, marriage and roommate problem, coalition formation problem, and so-
cial network. Ehlers (2018) extends So¨nmez’s result by replacing the core with a superset
called the individually-rational-core. Theorem 2 explains all of these results.
After discussing related literature in the rest of this section, we present our model in
3 It is known that substitutability and other assumptions are necessary to ensure the existence of stable
matchings and the existence and strategy-proofness of the doctor-optimal stable mechanism.
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Section 2, our theorems and their corollaries in Section 3, and applications in Section 4.
For ease of exposition, in Section 2 we assume a finite set of allocations in our model. This
assumption is relied upon by Theorem 2 and satisfied by our applications. In Section 5 we
explain that if the set of allocations is infinite, Theorem 1 holds as long as its assumptions
are valid, but the insight behind Theorem 1 holds more generally than its exposition. To
show this, in Section 5 we present an alternative version of Theorem 1 that is applicable
to more environments. But we also explain why the exposition of Theorem 1 is desirable.
We conclude the paper in Section 6. Appendix contains omitted proofs.
Related literature. Outside options enrich agents’ manipulation strategies, and there-
fore strengthen the restriction of strategy-proofness. Our theorems demonstrate implica-
tions of this strengthened restriction. Several results in the market design literature have
similarly relied on the role of outside options. In the school choice with coarse priorities
model, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) prove that when students have outside options, no
strategy-proof deterministic mechanism Pareto improves the deferred acceptance algo-
rithm (DA) equipped with any tie-breaking rule. As Alva and Manjunath (2019) have
explained, this result is implied by Theorem 1. Kesten and Kurino (2019) prove that
even if exogenous outside options are eliminated, as long as students can arbitrarily rank
schools in preferences, some schools will endogenously play the role of outside options.4
In the random assignment model, Martini (2016) proves that every IR and strategy-proof
mechanism that treats equals equally is wasteful. This result answers an open question
of Erdil (2014). In Section 4.1, we prove a result that also shows the tension between
efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness, and explains another result of Erdil (2014). It
similarly relies on the joint restriction of these axioms in the presence of outside options.
When agents can arbitrarily truncate preferences, strategy-proofness in our theorems
can be replaced by truncation-invariance. In the literature similar invariance notions
have been proposed in different models. In the object assignment model, Hashimoto et
al. (2014) define a notion called weak truncation robustness. In footnote 7 we explain that
our truncation-invariance is equivalent to their notion in the object assignment model.
Ehlers andKlaus (2014, 2016) define a different invariance notion for deterministic mech-
anisms. It requires that if an agent truncates preferences at a point that is worse than his
assignment, then the allocation for the whole market remain unchanged. This require-
ment is much stronger than truncation-invariance. In the matching with contracts model,
4When priorities are strict and students may not have outside options, Kesten (2010) has proved that
no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient deterministic mechanism Pareto improves DA.
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Hatfield et al. (2019) define a notion called truncation-consistency for deterministic mech-
anisms. It requires that if an agent truncates preferences at a point that is worse than his
assignment, then his assignment remain unchanged. Truncation-consistency essentially
coincides with truncation-invariance for deterministic mechanisms.
In the object assignment model, we propose a criterion to compare the numbers of
assignments in a benchmark mechanism and in a new mechanism that is supposed to
replace the benchmark. Our criterion requires that the new mechanism respect agents’
welfare in the benchmark in a very weak sense. Afacan et al. (2018) and Afacan and Dur
(2018) propose a different criterion to compare the number of assignments in two deter-
ministic mechanisms. In their criterion the two mechanisms are symmetric. Afacan et
al.’s (2018) aim to findmechanisms to maximize the number of assignments in the school
choice model. They show that maximality is incompatible with fairness and strategy-
proofness. Afacan and Dur (2018) prove two impossibility results in the same flavor as
ours. Compared with their results, ours uses weaker axioms, allows for weak preferences,
and holds for both deterministic mechanisms and random mechanisms.
2 Model
We use the abstract allocation model of Alva and Manjunath (2019). The model con-
sists of a finite set of agents I and a nonempty set of allocations A. For ease of exposition,
we assume that A is finite. We discuss the case of an infinite A in Section 5. We denote
an agent by i or j, and an allocation by a or b. Each allocation a is associated with a set
of participants, which is a subset of agents and denoted by I(a). For each agent i, define
Ai ≔ {a ∈ A : i ∈ I(a)} to be the set of allocations where i is a participant. If i does not
participate in an allocation a, i consumes his outside option denoted by o∗i . So i consumes
his outside option in every a ∈ A\Ai .
Each agent i has a complete, reflexive, and transitive preference relation %i onAi∪{o
∗
i }.
This setup means that i is indifferent between any two allocations where he consumes his
outside option.5 We allow i to have non-trivial indifferent preferences. That is, i could
be indifferent between two allocations where he is a participant, and could be indifferent
between an allocation where he is a participant and an allocation where he consumes
his outside option. Let ≻i denote the asymmetric component of %i and ∼i denote the
5Note that allocations and outside options in our model are abstract. If an agent cares about the alloca-
tion assigned to the other agents, he should be regarded as a participant in the allocation.
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symmetric component of %i . Let Ri denote i’s preference domain. Let %I≔ (%i)i∈I denote
a preference profile, and R≔ ×i∈IRi denote the domain of preference profiles.
For each agent i, we say an allocation a is acceptable to i if a %i o
∗
i , and is strictly accept-
able to i if a ≻i o
∗
i . An allocation a is individually rational (IR) if a %i o
∗
i for all i. We assume
that there exists an allocation where every i consumes o∗i . It ensures that there exists an
IR allocation for every preference profile.
For any two distinct allocations a and b, we say b weakly Pareto dominates a if b %i a for
all i; if there further exists j such that b ≻j a, we say b strictly Pareto dominates a; if a ∼i b
for all i, we say a and b are welfare-equivalent. An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is not
strictly Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
The following notations will simplify our exposition. For every a ∈ A and every i ∈ I ,
we define
A(%i ,a)≔ {b ∈ A : b %i a}, A(≻i ,a)≔ {b ∈ A : b ≻i a}, and A(∼i ,a)≔ {b ∈ A : b ∼i a}.
We call A(%i ,a) the upper contour set of a in %i , A(≻i ,a) the strict upper contour set of a
in %i , and A(∼i ,a) the indifference class of a in %i . We similarly define Ai(%i ,a), Ai(≻i ,a),
and Ai(∼i ,a) for every a ∈ A and every i ∈ I . So Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ) is the set of strictly acceptable
allocations for i, and Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) is the set of allocations in Ai that i regards as indifferent
with o∗i . For every i and every %i∈ Ri , we define
Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i )≔ {a ∈ Ai : there exists b ∈ Ai such that a ≻i b %i o
∗
i }.
If Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) , ∅, then Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) = Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ). If Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅, then Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )\Ai (Ïi ,o
∗
i ) is
the worst indifference class among strictly acceptable allocations. So in words, Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i )
is the part of Ai(%i ,o
∗
i ) that is not closest to o
∗
i in %i .
2.1 Random allocation
We regard the allocations in A as deterministic. A random allocation, denoted by p, is
a probability distribution on A. For every a, let pa denote the probability of a in p. For
every A ⊂ A, we define p[A]≔
∑
a∈A pa. Let ∆(A) denote the set of all random allocations.
Because every deterministic allocation can be regarded as a degenerate random alloca-
tion,6 we make the convention that A ⊂ ∆(A). With this convention, in the rest of the
paper we will simply call the elements of ∆(A) allocations, and when necessary we will
6A deterministic allocation a can be described as probability distribution p such that pa = 1 and pb = 0
for every b , a. So for every A ⊂ A, p[A] = 1 if and only if a ∈ A.
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call allocations in A deterministic to avoid confusion. An allocation p is individually ratio-
nal (IR) if, for every a with pa > 0, a is IR as a deterministic allocation. In other words, p
is IR if and only if for every i, p[A(%i ,o
∗
i )] = 1.
We use (first-order) stochastic dominance to extend agents’ preferences from deter-
ministic allocations to random allocations.
Definition 1 (Stochastic dominance). For any two allocations p and p′,
1. p′ weakly stochastically dominates p for agent i, denoted by p′ %sdi p, if, for all a ∈ A,
p′[A(%i ,a)] =
∑
b%ia
p′a ≥
∑
b%ia
pa = p[A(%i ,a)].
If the inequality is strict for some a, then p′ strictly stochastically dominates p for i.
If all inequalities are actually equalities, then p′ and p are welfare-equivalent for i.
We denote them respectively by p′ ≻sdi p and p
′ ∼sdi p.
2. p′ weakly stochastically dominates p if p′ %sdi p for all i.
If there exists j such that p′ ≻sdj p, then p
′ strictly stochastically dominates p.
If p′ ∼sdi p for all i, then p
′ and p are welfare-equivalent.
For deterministic allocations, stochastic dominance reduces to Pareto dominance.
For every allocation p and every i, p[Ai ] is i’s probability of being a participant in p.
We call it i’s participation size in p. For example, in the object assignment model in Section
4.1, a random allocation p specifies each agent’s probability of obtaining each object, and
p[Ai ] is i’s probability of obtaining an object. We define a criterion to compare agents’
participation sizes in two different allocations.
Definition 2 (Size dominance). For any two allocations p and p′, p′ weakly size dominates
p if p′[Ai ] ≥ p[Ai ] for all i. If the inequality is strict for some j, then p
′ strictly size dominates
p. If p′[Ai ] = p[Ai ] for all i, then p
′ and p are size-equivalent.
Agents’ participation sizes in an allocation are independent of their preferences, but
welfare comparison betweeen two allocations depends on agents’ preferences. So stochas-
tic dominance and size dominance are independent concepts. But when we impose the IR
constraint, an agent’s participation size contains information about his welfare. Specif-
ically, for every IR allocation p and every i, p[Ai ] = p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] + p[Ai (∼i ,o
∗
i )]. So p[Ai ]
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is an upper bound on i’s probability of being better off than choosing his outside option.
If Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅, then p[Ai ] is exactly i’s probability of being better off than choosing his
outside option. In that case, weak stochastic dominance implies weak size dominance for
IR allocations (yet strict stochastic dominance does not imply strict size dominance). This
motivates the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (No indifference with outside option (NI)). For every i and every %i∈ Ri ,
Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅.
NI holds when agents’ preferences are strict. It also holds where agents may regard
allocations they participate in as indifferent, but regard them as fundamentally different
from outside options. For example, kidney patients may regard compatible donors as
indifferent, but they do not regard compatible donors as indifferent with no transplant.
Our theorems rely on agents’ freedom of arbitrarily ranking outside options in prefer-
ences. This is formalized as a richness assumption on agents’ preference domains. Recall
that for every %i , Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) is the part of Ai(%i ,o
∗
i ) that is not closest to o
∗
i in %i .
Assumption 2 (Richness). For every i, every %i∈ Ri , and every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), there exists
%
′
i∈ Ri such that, for all b ∈ Ai , b %i a =⇒ b %
′
i a, and a ≻i b =⇒ a ≻
′
i o
∗
i ≻
′
i b.
Put differently, Richness requires that for every %i∈ Ri and every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), there
exist %′i∈ Ri such that Ai(%i ,a) = Ai(%
′
i ,a) = Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ) and Ai(∼
′
i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅. In words, o
∗
i is
ranked immediately below a in %′i , the upper contour set of a is invariant from %i to %
′
i ,
and there is no indifference between every a ∈ Ai and o
∗
i in %
′
i (so NI is assumed for %
′
i).
Because the allocations in Ai(%i ,o
∗
i )\Ai (%i ,a) become not acceptable in %
′
i , we call every
such %′i a contraction of %i at a. If some %
′
i ranks the allocations inAi in the same way as %i
does, we call it the truncation of %i at a and denote it by %
a
i . If Ri contains the truncation
of every %i∈ Ri at every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), we say Ri accommodates truncation.
Finally, we define a notion that coarsens welfare-equivalence. Recall that two alloca-
tions p and p′ are welfare-equivalent if for every i and every a ∈ A, p′[A(%i ,a)] = p[A(%i
,a)]. The notion only requires p′[A(%i ,a)] = p[A(%i ,a)] for every i and every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ).
Because Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) is the upper part of A in %i , we call this notion upper-equivalence.
Definition 3 (Upper-equivalence). Two allocations p and p′ are upper-equivalent if for ev-
ery i and every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), p
′[Ai(%i ,a)] = p[Ai(%i ,a)].
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2.2 Mechanism
A mechanism is a function ψ : R→ ∆(A) that finds an allocation for every preference
profile. If ψ always finds a deterministic allocation, then it is a deterministic mechanism. A
mechanism ψ is said to satisfy a property we have defined for allocations if, for all %I∈ R,
ψ(%I ) satisfies the property.
The criteria used to compare allocations are extended to mechanisms. For any two
mechanisms ψ′ and ψ, we say ψ′ weakly stochastically dominates ψ if, for all %I∈ R,
ψ′(%I ) weakly stochastically dominates ψ(%I ). If there further exists some %I where ψ
′(%I
) strictly stochastically dominates ψ(%I ), we say ψ
′ strictly stochastically dominates ψ.
We say ψ′ and ψ are welfare-equivalent if, for all %I∈ R, ψ
′(%I ) and ψ(%I ) are welfare-
equivalent. Size dominance and size-equivalence between mechanisms are similar.
By using direct mechanisms, we often want to incentivize agents to report true pref-
erences. This property is called strategy-proofness. For every %I∈ R and every i, let %−i
denote the preference profile of the agents other than i.
Definition 4. Amechanism ψ is strategy-proof if, for all %I∈ R, all i ∈ I and all %
′
i∈ Ri\{%i},
ψ(%I ) %
sd
i ψ(%
′
i ,%−i).
Let ψ be a strategy-proof mechanism. In any preference profile %I , suppose some i
contracts his preferences %i at some a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) and denote the contraction by %
′
i . Then
strategy-proofness requires that ψ(%I ) %
sd
i ψ(%
′
i ,%−i) and ψ(%
′
i ,%−i) %
′sd
i ψ(%I ). Because
Ai(%i ,a) = Ai(%
′
i ,a), the two conditions require that ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (%i
,a)]. That is, the probability mass of the upper contour set of a in %i is invariant when i
contracts his preferences at a. We call this property contraction-invariance.
Definition 5. A mechanism ψ is contraction-invariant if, for all %I∈ R, all i ∈ I , and all
a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), if %
′
i is a contraction of %i at a, then ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (%i ,a)].
If a contraction-invariant mechanism ψ is IR, then for all %I , all i, and all contraction
%
′
i of %i at all a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), because Ai(%i ,a) =Ai(%
′
i ,a) =Ai(%
′
i ,o
∗
i ) (since Ai(∼
′
i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅),
ψ(%′i ,%−i )[Ai ] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (%
′
i ,o
∗
i )] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (%i ,a)] = ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)].
In words, when i contracts his preferences at a, ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] is equal to i’s participation
size in the contracted preference profile. Our theorems will rely on this property.
When everyRi accommodates truncation, a weaker property than contraction-invariance
is called truncation-invariance. It only requires that the invariance property hold when
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agents truncates preferences.
Definition 6. Let everyRi accommodate truncation. Amechanismψ is truncation-invariant
if, for all %I∈ R, all i ∈ I , and all a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = ψ(%
a
i ,%−i)[Ai(%i ,a)].
7
In a deterministic mechanism ψ, ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = 1 if ψ(%I ) ∈ Ai(%i ,a), and otherwise
ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = 0. So ψ is truncation-invariant if for all %I , all i, and all a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ),
ψ(%ai ,%−i) %
a
i a if ψ(%I ) %i a, and otherwise a ≻
a
i ψ(%
a
i ,%−i).
3 Main theorems
Our first theorem presents the relation between stochastic dominance and size domi-
nance for IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Theorem 1. Let ψ and ψ′ be two IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
1. Under NI, ψ′ weakly stochastically dominates ψ =⇒ ψ′ weakly size dominates ψ.
2. Under Richness, ψ′ weakly size dominates ψ =⇒ ψ′ weakly stochastically dominates ψ.
Proof. (1) Fix a preference profile %I . Suppose p
′ and p are two IR allocations and p′
weakly stochastically dominates p. Then for every i, p[Ai ] = p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] + p[Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i )]
and p′[Ai ] = p
′[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] + p
′[Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i )]. NI requires Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅ and weak stochas-
tic dominance requires p′[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] ≥ p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )]. So p
′[Ai ] ≥ p[Ai ], meaning that p
′
weakly size dominates p.
(2) Suppose ψ′ weakly size dominates ψ, but ψ′ does not weakly stochastically dom-
inate ψ. It means that there exists %I and i such that ψ
′(%I ) 
sd
i ψ(%I ). Then there must
exist a ∈ A such that ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] > ψ
′(%I )[A(%i ,a)]. Because ψ and ψ
′ are IR, it must be
that a ≻i o
∗
i and thus A(%i ,a) = Ai(%i ,a). Because ψ
′ weakly size dominates ψ, it must be
that a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ); otherwise ψ
′(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] = ψ
′(%I )[Ai ] ≥ ψ(%I )[Ai ] = ψ(%I )[Ai(%i ,a)].
Under Richness, there exists a contraction %′i of %i at a. Because ψ and ψ
′ are strategy-
proof, they are contraction-invariant. So ψ(%′i ,%−i)[Ai ] = ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] and ψ
′(%′i ,%−i
)[Ai ] = ψ
′(%I )[A(%i ,a)]. This means that ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai ] > ψ
′(%′i ,%−i)[Ai ]. But it contradicts
the assumption that ψ′ weakly size dominates ψ.
7Truncation-invariance is equivalent to a seemingly stronger requirement that, for all %I∈ R, all i ∈ I ,
and all a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), ψ(%I )[Ai(∼i ,b)] = ψ(%
a
i ,%−i )[Ai(∼i ,b)] for all b ∈ Ai (%i ,a). To see this, note that for
every b ∈ Ai(≻i ,a), %
b
i is the truncation of both %i and %
a
i at b. By truncation-invariance, ψ(%I )[Ai(%i ,b)] =
ψ(%bi ,%−i )[Ai(%i ,b)] = ψ(%
a
i ,%−i )[Ai(%i ,b)]. In the object assignment model of Section 4.1, when agents have
strict preferences, Hashimoto et al. (2014) call such a stronger requirement weak truncation robustness.
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As we have explained in Section 2.1, when we impose the IR constraint and assume
NI, an agent’s participation size is his probability of being better off than choosing his
outside option. So weak stochastic dominance implies weak size dominance for IR alloca-
tions. The first part of Theorem 1 is unrelated to strategy-proofness of mechanisms. The
insight behind the second part of Theorem 1 is that, for any IR and strategy-proof mech-
anism ψ, when agents can arbitrarily contract preferences, relying on the contraction-
invariance property we can recover every i’s welfare in every %I from his participation
size in all possible contracted preference profiles. Specifically, to pin down i’s welfare in
ψ(%I ), we need to know ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] for every a ∈ A(%i ,o
∗
i ) (because ψ is IR). First, for
every a ∈ A(∼i ,o
∗
i ), IR implies that ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] = 1. Second, for every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ),
by contraction-invariance, ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] is equal to i’s participation size in ψ(%
′
i ,%−i )
where %′i is any contraction of %i at a. Last, if Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ) , Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), which means that
Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅, for every a ∈ Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )\Ai (Ïi ,o
∗
i ), ψ(%I )[A(%i ,a)] is equal to i’s participation
size in ψ(%I ). Therefore, for IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, weak size dominance
implies weak stochastic dominance.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that, whenNI and Richness both hold, stochas-
tic dominance is equivalent to size dominance for IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Corollary 1. Let ψ and ψ′ be two IR and strategy-proof mechanisms. Under NI and Richness:
1. ψ′ strictly stochastically dominates ψ ⇔ ψ′ strictly size dominates ψ.
2. ψ′ is welfare-equivalent to ψ ⇔ ψ′ is size-equivalent to ψ.
Our second theorem presents an implication of strategy-proofness given a finite set
of allocations in our model. We prove that, under Richness, for any two strategy-proof
mechanisms, if their found allocations for a preference profile are upper-equivalent only
if the found allocations are actually welfare-equivalent, then the two mechanisms must
find welfare-equivalent allocations for every preference profile.
Theorem 2. Let ψ and ψ′ be two strategy-proof mechanisms. Under Richness, if for every
%I∈ R, ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are upper-equivalent =⇒ ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are welfare-equivalent,
then ψ and ψ′ are welfare-equivalent.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that ψ and ψ′ are not welfare-equivalent. De-
fine R∗ ≔ {%I∈ R : ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not welfare-equivalent}. Then for every %I∈ R
∗,
ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not upper-equivalent. Arbitrarily choose %I∈ R
∗ and fix it. Be-
cause ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not upper-equivalent, there exist i and a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) such that
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ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] , ψ
′(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)]. Under Richness, let %
′
i be any contraction of %i at a.
Because ψ and ψ′ are strategy-proof, ψ(%′i ,%−i)[Ai (%
′
i ,a)] = ψ(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)] and ψ
′(%′i ,%−i
)[Ai (%
′
i ,a)] = ψ
′(%I )[Ai (%i ,a)]. So ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (%
′
i ,a)] , ψ
′(%′i ,%−i)[Ai (%
′
i ,a)], meaning that
ψ(%′i ,%−i ) and ψ
′(%′i ,%−i ) are not welfare-equivalent. Then ψ(%
′
i ,%−i) and ψ
′(%′i ,%−i) are
not upper-equivalent. Using the above argument again, we can contract some agent’s
preferences in (%′i ,%−i) to obtain another preference profile where the allocations found
by ψ and ψ′ are not welfare-equivalent. Iteratively using this argument means repeat-
edly contracting agents’ preferences. But because I and A are finite, we cannot contract
agents’ preferences for infinitely many times. This is a contradiction.
An equivalent formulation of Theorem 2 is that, for any two strategy-proof mech-
anisms ψ and ψ′, if for every %I , ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not welfare-equivalent only if
they are not upper-equivalent, then ψ and ψ′ must be welfare-equivalent. In Section 4
we present several applications of this formulation. To prove ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not
upper-equivalent, we need to find i and a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ) such that ψ(%I )[Ai(%i ,a)] , ψ
′(%I
)[Ai (%i ,a)]. If ψ and ψ
′ are deterministic mechanisms, we need to find i and a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i )
such that ψ(%I ) %i a ≻i ψ
′(%I ) or ψ
′(%I ) %i a ≻i ψ(%I ).
We point out two differences between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. First, Theorem
2 relies on the assumption of a finite A, whereas Theorem 1 actually does not rely on it.
Theorem 1 holds whenA is infinite, as long as relevant concepts are properly rephrased to
deal with the measurability issue.8 But Theorem 2 relies on the fact that, with a finite A,
starting with any preference profile %I , by iteratively letting agents contract preferences,
we can find a sequence of preference profiles (%1I ,%
2
I , . . . ,%
n
I ) such that %
1
I=%I and in %
n
I , for
every i, Ai(Ï
n
i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅. Obviously, the allocations found by any two strategy-proof mech-
anisms ψ and ψ′ for every such %nI are upper-equivalent. The essence of Theorem 2 is
that, if upper-equivalence in any preference profile implies welfare-equivalence, then, by
contraction-invariance, the welfare-equivalence between ψ(%nI ) andψ
′(%nI ) implies upper-
equivalence and therefore welfare-equivalence between ψ(%n−1I ) and ψ
′(%n−1I ). By induc-
tively applying this argument, we prove that for every %I , ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are welfare-
equivalent. Second, Theorem 2 holds for strategy-proof mechanisms that need not to be
IR, while Theorem 1 requires IR. This is because Theorem 1 relates agents’ participa-
tion sizes to their welfare, but Theorem 2 does not use agents’ participation sizes. As we
8When A is infinite, we assume that for every %i∈ Ri and every a ∈ A, all of A(%i ,a), A(≻i ,a) and
A(∼i ,a) are measurable. A random allocation is a probability measure. A probability measure p
′ weakly
stochastically dominates anothe probability measure p for agent i if, for all a ∈ A, p′[A(%i ,a)] ≥ p[A(%i ,a)].
Then the proof of Theorem 1 remains as before as long as Richness and NI are assumed.
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have explained, an agent’s participation size in an allocation does not contain information
about his welfare unless IR is assumed.
Finally, we compare our theorems with Alva and Manjunath (2019). Theorem 1 ex-
tends AM’s theorem from deterministic mechanisms to random mechanisms. Our NI is
made by AM, but our Richness is different from AM’s richness assumption. AM’s richness
assumes that, for every %i∈ Ri and every a,b ∈ Ai with b ≻i a %i o
∗
i , there exists %
′
i∈ Ri
such that b ≻′i o
∗
i ≻
′
i a, and for all c ∈ Ai , c %
′
i o
∗
i ⇒ c ≻i a. In some sense %
′
i shrinks the set of
acceptable allocations in %i . The choice of %
′
i depends on a and b, the upper contour set of
b needs not to be invariant from %i to %
′
i , and when it is invariant, it needs not to be equal
to the strict upper contour set of o∗i in %
′
i . So AM’s richness is more relaxed than ours.
AM’s richness is sufficient to obtain Theorem 1 for deterministic mechanisms, because
agents’ participation sizes in deterministic allocations are degenerate and their prefer-
ences over deterministic allocations are complete. When we use stochastic dominance to
compare welfare in random allocations and to define strategy-proofness, we have to rely
on contraction-invariance to demonstrate the structure of allocations found by strategy-
proof mechanisms. This requires some invariant upper contour set in agents’ preferences
when we connect different preference profiles. This requirement is incorporated into our
Richness assumption. There is no counterpart of Theorem 2 in AM’s paper.
In Section 3.1 we present useful corollaries of our theorems. In Section 3.2 we discuss
truncation-invariant mechanisms.
3.1 Efficiency frontier of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms
Within any class of mechanisms, a member is on the efficiency frontier if it is not
strictly stochastically dominated by any other member. In the object assignment model
(see Section 4.1), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) call a mechanism ordinally efficient if
it is not strictly stochastically dominated by any other mechanism. Clearly, within any
class of mechanisms, its ordinally efficient members must be on the efficiency frontier.
But Erdil (2014) proves that, within the class of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, non-
wastefulness, which is weaker than ordinal efficiency, is sufficient for a member to be on
the efficiency frontier. We can similarly define ordinal efficiency in our model. But below
we present some properties weaker than ordinal efficiency that are sufficient for a mech-
anism to be on the efficiency frontier of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms in our model.
In Section 4.1, we will show that these properties are weaker than non-wastefulness in
the object assignment model.
14
Definition 7 (Bidominance). For any two allocations p and p′, p′ bidominates p if p′ strictly
stochastically dominates p and also strictly size dominates p; p′ strongly bidominates p if p′
bidominates p and for every i, p′ ≻sdi p ⇒ p
′[Ai ] > p[Ai ]. An allocation p is unbidominated
if it is not bidominated by any other allocation, and is not-strongly-bidominated if it is not
strongly bidominated by any other allocation.
If p′ bidominates p, p′ cannot strictly stochastically dominate p through reassigning
probabilities of deterministic allocations without increasing agents’ participation sizes.
If p′ strongly bidominates p, for every better off agent in p′, his participation size is
increased in p′. We say a mechanism is unbidominated/not-strongly-bidominated if it
always finds allocations of such properties. Example 1 illustrates these concepts.
Example 1 (Illustration of bidominance). Suppose I = {i, j} and A = {a,b,c,o∗}. The par-
ticipants in each deterministic allocation are as follows: I(a) = I(b) = {i, j}, I(c) = {i}, and
I(o∗) = ∅. So i participates in a,b,c, and j participates in a,b. Agents have the following
preferences: b ≻i c ≻i a ≻i o
∗ and b ≻j a ≻j c ∼j o
∗. Consider the following five allocations:
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
1/2a,1/2o∗ 1/2b,1/2o∗ 1/2b,1/2c 1b 1a
All of p2,p3,p4,p5 strictly stochastically dominate p1. p2 does not bidominate p1 because
no agent’s participation size is increased in p2. p3 bidominates p1 because i’s participation
size is increased in p3. But p3 does not strongly bidominate p1 because j is better off in p3 yet
his participation size is not increased in p3. p4 and p5 strongly bidominate p1 because every
agent’s participation size is increased.
Because every agent most prefers b, p4 is the only ordinally efficient allocation. p5 is strictly
stochastically dominated by p4. But because every agent’s participation size in p5 is one, p5
is unbidominated. p3 is bidominated by p4, because both agents become strictly better off and
j’s participation size is increased in p4. But p3 is not-strongly-bidominated, because the only
way to strictly stochastically dominate p3 is to move probabilities from c to b and this makes i
strictly better off but does not increase i’s participation size.
We first present a corollary of Theorem 1. If an allocation p is unbidominated, then
any allocation p′ that strictly stochastically dominates p has to be size-equivalent to p. So
if two strategy-proof mechanisms ψ′ and ψ′′ strictly stochastically dominate some IR and
unbidominated mechanism ψ, then ψ′ and ψ′′ are size-equivalent to ψ and are therefore
size-equivalent to each other. By Theorem 1, under Richness, ψ′ and ψ′′ are welfare-
equivalent. It means that in terms of welfare at most one strategy-proof mechanism can
15
strictly stochastically dominate an IR and unbidominated mechanism. Furthermore, if ψ
is strategy-proof, then ψ′ and ψ′′ have to be welfare-equivalent to ψ, which contradicts
the assumption that they strictly stochastically dominate ψ. So under Richness, unbidom-
inated mechanisms are on the efficiency frontier of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Corollary 2. Let ψ be an IR and unbidominated mechanism. Under Richness:
1. If ψ′ and ψ′′ are two strategy-proof mechanisms that strictly stochastically dominate ψ,
then ψ′ and ψ′′ are welfare-equivalent.
2. Ifψ is strategy-proof, thenψ is not strictly stochastically dominated by any other strategy-
proof mechanism.
We then present a corollary of Theorem 2. If an IR and not-strongly-bidominated al-
location p is strictly stochastically dominated by an allocation p′, then there exists i such
that p′ ≻sdi p and p
′[Ai ] ≤ p[Ai ]. Suppose NI holds. Then p
′ ≻sdi p implies p
′[Ai ] ≥ p[Ai ].
So we must have p′[Ai ] = p[Ai ]. Then p
′ ≻sdi p requires that there exist a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i )
such that p′[Ai (%i ,a)] > p[Ai(%i ,a)]. That is, p and p
′ are not upper-equivalent. This ob-
servation means that, under NI, if an IR, not-strongly-bidominated and strategy-proof
mechanism ψ is strictly stochastically dominated by another strategy-proof mechanism
ψ′, then for every %I where ψ
′(%I ) and ψ(%I ) are not welfare-equivalent, they are neither
upper-equivalent. If Richness also holds, by Theorem 2, ψ and ψ′ are welfare-equivalent,
which is a contradiction. So under NI and Richness, not-strongly-bidominated mecha-
nisms are on the efficiency frontier of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Corollary 3. Under NI and Richness, an IR, not-strongly-bidominated and strategy-proof
mechanism is not strictly stochastically dominated by any other strategy-proof mechanism.
Because unbidominated mechanisms are not-strongly-bidominated, but the converse
is not true, Corollary 3 is stronger than the second statement of Corollary 2 when NI
and Richness both hold. However, Corollary 3 relies on a finite A, but Corollary 2 does
not. When we are interested in a subclass of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, we can
define unbidominated/not-strongly-bidominated mechanisms within the subclass. Then
the second statement of Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 hold within the subclass. We will
present an application in Section 4.
Alva and Manjunath (2019) call a ∈ A Pareto-constrained participation-maximal if there
does not exist b ∈ A that weakly Pareto dominates a and strictly participation expands a.9
9AM say b strictly participation expands a if I(a) ( I(b). It is the degeneration of strict size dominance.
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While, we say a is unbidominated if there does not exist b that strictly Pareto dominates
a and strictly participation expands a. Under NI, this difference disappears because if
b weakly Pareto dominates a and strictly participation expands a, then b must strictly
Pareto dominate a. This is why AM assume both NI and richness in their results for
Pareto-constrained participation-maximality, while our Corollary 2 only assumes Rich-
ness. There is no counterpart of strong bidominance and Corollary 3 in AM’s paper.
3.2 Truncation-invariant mechanism
Though our theorems are presented for strategy-proof mechanisms, their proofs rely
only on contraction-invariance, which is weaker than strategy-proofness. When pref-
erence domains accommodate truncation, our theorems hold for truncation-invariant
mechanisms that are not strategy-proof. Truncation-invariance describes a structure of
the allocations found by a mechanism when agents truncate preferences. It can be im-
plied by properties unrelated to incentive. For example, in the matching with contracts
model (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005), if substitutability and law of aggregate demand are
not assumed for hospitals’ choice functions, the doctor-optimal stable mechanism may
not exist, and if it exists, it may not be strategy-proof. But in Section 4.3 we prove that if
it exists, doctor-optimal stability implies that it is truncation-invariant. This enables us
to explain the results of Hirata and Kasuya (2017) using our terminology and theorems.
Some other mechanisms in matching theory are not strategy-proof, but their algorithmic
procedures naturally imply truncation-invariance. For example, when agents have strict
preferences, in the Boston mechanism (BM) in the school choice model (Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez, 2003) and the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) in the object assignment
model (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), agents report favorite schools/objects step by
step, and the allocation found at each step is permanent and depends only on agents’
preferences revealed by the step.10 This means that BM and PS are truncation-invariant.
Of course, when strategy-proofness is given up, it raises the concern that agents may
misreport preferences. If two IR and truncation-invariant mechanisms are observed to be
size-equivalent, we are not sure whether they are size-equivalent with respect to agents’
true preferences. Then we are hesitant to conclude that the two mechanisms are welfare-
equivalent. This is why we focus on strategy-proof mechanisms in our theorems. But in
10 In every round of BM, students apply for favorite schools that have not rejected them, and schools with
empty seats admit new applicants according to priority rankings. In PS, agents consume probability shares
of objects with equal rates.
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some environments there are reasons to focus on non-strategy-proof mechanisms because
strategy-proofness conflicts with other important goals. For example, in the object assign-
ment model, several papers have demonstrated the conflict between efficiency, fairness,
and strategy-proofness (Zhou, 1990; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Martini, 2016; Nes-
terov, 2017). When efficiency and fairness are primary goals, we have to give up strategy-
proofness. We should also be aware that recent studies suggest that agents may not report
true preferences in some strategy-proof mechanisms, and that some strategy-proof mech-
anisms are more likely to incentivize truth-telling than the others (Li, 2017; Ashlagi and
Gonczarowski, 2018; Rees-Jones and Skowronek, 2018; Hassidim et al., 2017). Whether
agents will report true preferences in a mechanism in a specific environment is an empir-
ical question. Our theorems are useful to reveal the structure of non-strategy-proof but
truncation-invarianct mechanisms when incentive is not a concern.
4 Applications
We present four applications to show the usefulness of our theorems. Alva and Man-
junath (2019) have presented several applications to show its usefulness of Theorem 1
for deterministic mechanisms. In the first application we show its usefulness for ran-
dom mechanisms. We apply Theorem 1 to the object assignment model and obtain new
findings. These findings strengthen and explain Erdil (2014). We use the remaining ap-
plications to show the usefulness of Theorem 2, because it is a new result for deterministic
mechanisms as well as for random mechanisms. In the second application we propose a
size improvement relation between mechanisms in the object assignment model to ad-
dress the question that when it is possible to replace an existing mechanism with a new
one to increase the number of assignments. This question is relevant in real-life markets
where increasing the number of assignments is a desirable goal. We apply Theorem 2 to
obtain an impossibility result. In third application we consider two different two-sided
matching models. We show that Theorem 2 can explain all results of Hirata and Kasuya
(2017) in the many-to-one matching with contracts model, and a characterization result
of Combe et al. (2020) in their teacher reassignment model. In the last application we
provide a new proof of the main theorems of So¨nmez (1999) and Ehlers (2018). We show
that the logic in Theorem 2 lies behind their theorems.
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4.1 Stochastic dominance in the object assignment problem
In the object assignment model, a finite set of indivisible objects O are assigned to a
finite set of agents I . Each object o has qo ∈N copies, and each agent i demands a copy of
an object and has a strict preference relation %i over O˜ ≔ O ∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes every
agent’s outside option of obtaining nothing. The preference domain of each agent is the
set of all strict preferences P . So NI and Richness are satisfied.
An allocation is represented by a nonnegative matrix p = (pi,o)i∈I ,o∈O˜ where
∑
i∈I pi,o ≤
qo for all o ∈ O and
∑
o∈O˜ pi,o = 1 for all i ∈ I . Every pi,o denotes the probability that
i obtains a copy of o, and pi = (pi,o)o∈O˜ is the lottery assigned to i. An allocation p is
deterministic if every pi,o ∈ {0,1}.
11 The participants in every deterministic allocation are
those who obtain objects. For every i and every o, we define ‖pi‖ ≔
∑
o∈O pi,o, ‖po‖ ≔∑
i∈I pi,o, and ‖p‖ ≔
∑
i∈I ‖pi‖. So ‖pi‖ is i’s participation size in p, and ‖p‖ is the total
amount of objects assigned to agents in p. We call ‖p‖ the size of p. Stochastic dominance
and size dominance between allocations/mechanisms are defined as in our model.
An allocation p is IR if for all i ∈ I and all o ∈O, pi,o > 0⇒ o ≻i ∅. p is non-wasteful if it
is IR and there do not exist i ∈ I and o ∈ O such that ‖po‖ < qo and o ≻i o
′ for some o′ ∈ O˜
with pi,o′ > 0. A non-wasteful allocation must be unbidominated, but an unbidominated
allocation may be wasteful.12
After defining the above notions, we state the corollary of Theorem 1. Because prefer-
ences in this model are strict, welfare-equivalence means coincidence.
Corollary 4. In the object assignment model with strict preferences, for any two IR and strategy-
proof mechanisms ψ and ψ′,
1. ψ′ strictly size dominates ψ ⇐⇒ ψ′ strictly stochastically dominates ψ;
2. ψ′ is size-equivalent to ψ ⇐⇒ ψ′ = ψ;
3. if ψ is not-strongly-bidominated, ψ is not strictly stochastically dominated by ψ′.
11By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem and its generalization (Birkhoff, 1946; Von Neumann, 1953;
Kojima and Manea, 2010), every allocation is a probability distribution over deterministic allocations.
12 Suppose a non-wasteful allocation p is bidominated by another allocation p′. Then it must be that
‖p′‖ > ‖p‖. So there exist o ∈O and i ∈ I such that ‖po‖ < ‖p
′
o‖ ≤ qo and pi,o < p
′
i,o. Because p is non-wasteful,
it must be that ‖pi‖ = 1. But because i is weakly better off in p
′, there must exist o′ ∈O such that o ≻i o
′ and
pi,o′ > 0. However, this means that p is wasteful.
On the other hand, suppose there are two agents i, j and two objects o,o′, each having two copies. Both
agents prefer o to o′ and prefer o′ to ∅. The allocation where both agents obtain (1/2o,1/2o′) is unbidomi-
nated because every agent’s participation size is one. But it is wasteful because o is wasted.
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Erdil (2014) says that a mechanism ψ′ is of greater size than another mechanism ψ if,
for every %I , ‖ψ
′(%I )‖ ≥ ‖ψ(%I )‖, and for some %
′
I , ‖ψ
′(%′I )‖ > ‖ψ(%
′
I )‖. Erdil proves that,
within the class of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, a mechanism strictly stochasti-
cally dominates another mechanism only if the former is of greater size than the latter,
and non-wasteful mechanisms are on the efficiency frontier. Clearly, size dominance im-
plies greater size. So Corollary 4 explains and strengthens Erdil’s results. We know that
Corollary 4 actually holds for IR and truncation-invariant mechanisms. So it implies that
a non-wasteful and strategy-proof random mechanism is not strictly stochastically dom-
inated by PS, and a non-wasteful and strategy-proof deterministic mechanism (e.g., DA)
is not strictly Pareto dominated by BM.13
Being not-strongly-bidominated is sufficient for a mechanism to be on the efficiency
frontier of IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, but it is not necessary. This is shown by
Proposition 1 below. Among IR and strategy-proof mechanisms, the random priority
mechanism (RP) is desirable because it is not only strategy-proof but also satisfies ex-post
Pareto efficiency (ExPE) and equal treatment of equals (ETE).14 But Erdil finds that although
RP is a randomization over non-wasteful deterministic mechanisms,15 RP is wasteful as
a random mechanism. When there is one copy of each object, Erdil constructs a strategy-
proof mechanism to strictly stochastically dominate RP. However, Erdil shows that waste-
fulness of RP cannot be eliminated through strategy-proof improvement: any strategy-
proof mechanism that strictly stochastically dominates RP is still wasteful. Proposition 1
shows that this is not due to RP as a benchmark mechanism. We prove that any IR and
strategy-proof mechanism ψ that satisfies ExPE and ETE is strongly bidominated and
any strategy-proof mechanism ψ′ that strictly stochastically dominates ψ is still strongly
bidominated. This result is not implied by our theorems, so we prove it in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. In the object assignment model with strict preferences, suppose |I | ≥ 4, |O| ≥ 3,
and qo = 1 for all o ∈ O. Let ψ be an IR and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies ETE and
ExPE, and ψ′ be a strategy-proof mechanism that strictly stochastically dominates ψ. Then
both ψ and ψ′ are strongly bidominated.
Proof. In Appendix A, we introduce another invariance property we call size-invariance.
13DA and BM can be regarded as mechanisms to solve the object assignment model where priorities used
by objects to rank agents are regarded as a part of the definition of these mechanisms.
14An allocation satisfies ExPE if it can be written as a convex combination of Pareto efficient deterministic
allocations, and it satisfies ETE if agents of equal preferences obtain equal lotteries.
15RP is the randomization over the serial dictatorship mechanisms by drawing the ordering of agents
uniformly at random.
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It requires that if an agent changes his preferences without changing the set of accept-
able objects, his participation size should be invariant. Truncation-invariance and size-
invariance capture different restrictions of strategy-proofness. The proof of Proposition
1 relies only on the two invariance properties.
Martini (2016) has proved that an IR and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies ETE
must be wasteful. In Proposition 1, ExPE of ψ is necessary for proving that ψ′ is strongly
bidominated. To see it, consider the mechanism that always assigns ∅ to agents. This
mechanism is IR and strategy-proof and satisfies ETE. But it violates ExPE. It is strictly
Pareto dominated by the serial dictatorship mechanism (with any ordering of agents),
which is strategy-proof and non-wasteful.
4.2 Size improvement in the object assignment problem
In this subsection we propose a size improvement relation between mechanisms in the
object assignment model. We ask the following question. Suppose a mechanism has been
used in a market, but the market designer wants to replace it with a new one to increase
the total number of objects assigned to agents (i.e., the size of the allocation). We want
to know when the replacement is (im)possible if the two mechanisms satisfy some desir-
able properties. Kidney exchange and refugee resettlement are exemplary markets that
motivate our question. Kidney exchange becomes widespread in the last decade to over-
come the shortage of deceased-donor kidneys and the medical incompatibility between
living donors and their intended recipients. Resettlement is the transfer of refugees from
an asylum country to another country that agrees to admit them and ultimately grant
them permanent settlement. At least two features in these markets motivate our ques-
tion. First, not all resources in these markets are acceptable to agents. A donated kidney
may be medically incompatible with a patient, and a refugee may be unable to live in a
country/city for various reasons. Second, it is far more important for an agent in these
markets to get an acceptable resource than to get a better resource when an acceptable
resource has been guaranteed. Being unmatched is very undesirable. This explains why
the market designer wants to increase the number of acceptable assignments in these
markets.16 There are other markets where our question makes sense.
16Optimization and market design techniques have been used in kidney exchange and refugee resettle-
ment to maximize the number of acceptable assignments. See Roth et al. (2005); So¨nmez et al. (forthcom-
ing); Kratz and Andersson (2019); Andersson and Ehlers (2019).
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In our question, the old mechanism will restrict the replacement because agents’ ini-
tial welfare needs to be respected. In practice, when a market designer wants to imple-
ment a new mechanism that harms some people, those people will complain/oppose the
replacement, which becomes an obstacle to the replacement. In our question, if the new
mechanism Pareto improves the old, all agents will be glad to support the replacement.
But if some agents are harmed in the new mechanism, they may oppose the replacement.
We assume that agents are altruistic and agree that increasing the number of acceptable
assignments is desirable for the society as a whole. But because being unmatched is very
undesirable, an agent will oppose the replacement if and only if he is matched in the
old mechanism but become unmatched in the new one. We assume that in this case the
only excuse the market designer can use to justify the replacement is that the number of
acceptable assignments is strictly increased in the new mechanism. In other words, if the
new mechanism does not strictly increase the number of acceptable assignments, every
matched agent in the old mechanism must also be matched in the newmechanism, which
means that the allocations found by the two mechanisms are size-equivalent. When ran-
dom mechanisms are used, agents compare their participation sizes before and after the
replacement.
Formally, we study the object assignment model in Section 4.1, but now we allow for
weak preferences. In kidney exchange, a patient prefers compatible donors to incompat-
ible donors, and, among compatible donors, prefers live donors to cadavers because the
former have a higher chance of success. But a patient is indifferent between donors of the
same type. Similarly, a refugee is indifferent between resettlement locations of similar
characteristics. We assume that agents are never indifferent between a real object and the
status of being unmatched. Let B denote the set of all complete, reflexive, and transitive
preference relation % on O˜ ≔ O ∪ {∅} such that for every o ∈ O, either o ≻ ∅ or ∅ ≻ o. B is
the preference domain of all agents. So NI and Richness are satisfied. Allowing for weak
preferences enables us to accommodate more environments, but as we will explain, our
result holds when agents’ preferences are strict.
Now we define the size improvement relation between mechanisms.
Definition 8. A new mechanism ψ′ size improves an old mechanism ψ if
1. ∀ %I , ‖ψ
′(%I )‖ ≥ ‖ψ(%I )‖, and ∃ %
′
I , ‖ψ
′(%′I )‖ > ‖ψ(%
′
I )‖;
2. ∀ %I , ‖ψ
′(%I )‖ = ‖ψ(%I )‖ =⇒ ψ
′(%I ) is size-equivalent to ψ(%I ).
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For two IR mechanisms ψ and ψ′, if ψ′ strict size dominates ψ, then ψ′ size improves
ψ. But the converse is not true. So the following result is not implied by Theorem 1.
Proposition 2. In the object assignment model with weak preferences, an IR, unbidominated,
and truncation-invariant mechanism is not size improved by any other IR and truncation-
invariant mechanism.
By presenting Proposition 2 for truncation-invariant mechanisms, we intend to apply
it to non-strategy-proof mechanisms. In the proof of the proposition, a crucial step is to
prove the following lemma. This lemma enables us to apply Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Fixing %I , for any two IR allocations p and p
′, if p is unbidominated and ‖p′‖ > ‖p‖,
then p and p′ are not upper-equivalent.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose ψ and ψ′ are two IR and truncation-invariant mecha-
nisms, ψ is unbidominated, and ψ′ size improves ψ. For every %I , if ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are
not size-equivalent, then it must be that ‖ψ′(%I )‖ > ‖ψ(%I )‖. By Lemma 1, ψ
′(%I ) andψ(%I )
are not upper-equivalent. Because NI holds, if ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not size-equivalent,
then they are not welfare-equivalent. So ψ(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) are not welfare-equivalent only
if they are not upper-equivalent. By Theorem 2, ψ′ and ψ are welfare-equivalent. So they
are size-equivalent, which is a contradiction.
If agents have strict preferences, Lemma 1 holds and its proof can be simplified. So
Proposition 2 holds when agents have strict preferences, with P being the domain.
The implication of Proposition 2 can be understood from two perspectives. Suppose
the old mechanism is not too inefficient (being unbidominated), and the old and the new
mechanisms satisfy properties that imply truncation-invariance. If it is important to re-
spect agents’ initial welfare, then the old mechanism cannot be replaced by the new one.
While if the market designer has enough power to implement the replacement regardless
of agents’ initial welfare, then it is inevitable that sometimes the replacement harms some
agents in favor of some others, but does not help the society as a whole.
We apply Proposition 2 to well-known deterministic mechanisms in the literature
where agents’ preferences are strict: Deferred Acceptance (DA; Gale and Shapley, 1962),
Boston Mechanism (BM; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005), Top Trading Cycle (TTC; Shapley
and Scarf, 1974), Serial Dictatorship (SD; Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981), Hier-
archical Exchange (HE; Pa´pai, 2000), and Trading Cycles (TC; Pycia and U¨nver, 2017).
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Some of these mechanisms rely on priorities used by objects to rank agents. Here we re-
gard priorities as a part of the definitions of these mechanisms. All of these mechanisms
except BM are strategy-proof.17 As we have explained in Section 3.2, the algorithmic
procedure of BM implies truncation-invariance. All of these mechanisms except DA is
Pareto efficient. DA is unbidominated because it is non-wasteful. So we obtain the fol-
lowing corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary 5. In the object assignment model with strict preferences, none of DA, BM, TTC,
SD, HE, and TC is size improved by any other truncation-invariant mechanism. In particular,
they do not size improve each other.
Proposition 2 is also applicable to random mechanisms. For example, when agents
have strict preferences, because PS is IR, non-wasteful and truncation-invariant, PS is
not size improved by any other truncation-invariant mechanism. In Appendix C, we
construct a mechanism that strictly size dominates PS. The mechanism is not truncation-
invariant, but it is ordinally efficient and envy-free, which are the flagship properties of
PS. This answers an open question raised by Huang and Tian (2017) on the existence of
an ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanism that improves the size of PS. It also shows
that truncation-invariance of the improving mechanism is necessary for Proposition 2 to
hold. In Appendix C, we construct another IR and unbidominated mechanism that is
not truncation-invariant but is strictly size dominated by PS. It means that truncation-
invariance of the old mechanism is also necessary for Proposition 2 to hold. Last, because
Erdil (2014) has constructed a strategy-proof mechanism to bidominate RP, being un-
bidominated of the old mechanism is also necessary for Proposition 2 to hold.
4.3 Two-sided matching
We use Theorem 2 and its corollaries to explain existing results in two different match-
ing models. In many-to-one matching with contracts, the doctor-optimal stable mecha-
nism (DOSM) finds a stable matching that Pareto dominates every other stable matching.
It is known that substitutability, law of aggregate demand (LAD), and irrelevance of re-
jected contracts (IRC) for hospitals’ choice functions are sufficient and in some sense also
necessary for the existence of stable matchings and the existence and strategy-proofness
of DOSM (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005; Aygu¨n and So¨nmez, 2013). Actually, under those
17Pycia and U¨nver (2011) extend TC and HE to the environment where each object may have several
copies, and prove that the extended mechanisms are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof.
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assumptions DOSM is the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. When only substi-
tutability and IRC are assumed, DOSM exists but may not be strategy-proof, and when
only IRC is assumed, stable mechanisms may not exist. Interestingly, Hirata and Kasuya
(2017) (HK for short) prove that the uniqueness of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms
and the special role of DOSM hold more fundamentally than what the literature believed
before. Only assuming IRC, HK prove that there is at most one stable and strategy-proof
mechanism, and when DOSM exists, it is the only candidate. HK also propose a notion
of non-wastefulness (different than the notion in the object assignment model), and prove
that any non-wasteful and strategy-proof mechanism is not strictly Pareto dominated by
any other individually rational (for both doctors and hospitals) and strategy-proof mech-
anism. Under IRC, stable mechanisms are non-wasteful.
Proposition 3 (Hirata and Kasuya (2017)). In many-to-one matching with contracts, under
IRC, (1) there is at most one stable and strategy-proof mechanism, and if the doctor-optimal
stable mechanism exists, it is the only candidate; (2) a non-wasteful and strategy-proof mecha-
nism is not Pareto dominated by any other individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism.
Because we will explain the above result using our terminology in detail, let us briefly
define HK’s model. A finite set of doctors D sign contracts with a finite set of hospitals
H . Each contract x involves a doctor d(x) and a hospital h(x). Let X be the finite set
of contracts. A subset of contracts X ′ is a matching if it includes at most one contract
for each doctor; denote by x(d,X ′) the contract involving d and by x(h,X ′) the set of
contracts involving h. Each d ∈ D has a strict preference relation %d over {x ∈ X : d(x) =
d} ∪ {∅}, where ∅ is the outside option of not signing any contract. All strict preferences
are possible. Each h ∈ H has a choice function Ch such that for all X
′ ⊂ X, Ch(X
′) =
Ch(x(h,X
′)) ⊂ x(h,X ′). Ch satisfies IRC if for all X
′ ⊂ X and x ∈ X, x < Ch(X
′ ∪ {x}) implies
Ch(X
′ ∪ {x}) = Ch(X
′).18 A matching X ′ is individually rational if x(d,X ′) %d ∅ for all d and
Ch(X
′) = x(h,X ′) for all h. X ′ is blocked by (h,X ′′) with h ∈ H and X ′′ ⊂ X if X ′′ ∩X ′ = ∅,
x(h,X ′′) ⊂ Ch(X
′ ∪ X ′′) and x(d,X ′′) ≻d x(d,X
′) for all d ∈ {d(x)}x∈X ′′ . X
′ is stable if it is
individually rational and unblocked. X ′ is non-wasteful if it is individually rational and
there does not exist another individually rational matching X ′′ such that X ′ ( X ′′.
To prove Proposition 3, HK prove the following lemma. In our terminology, the lemma
proves that if two stable mechanisms find different matchings for a preference profile of
doctors, the matchings are not upper-equivalent. By Theorem 2, it implies that any two
18Alva (2018) extends IRC to choice correspondences and shows its equivalence to weak axiom of re-
vealed preference.
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stable and strategy-proof mechanisms must coincide.
Lemma 2 (Hirata and Kasuya (2017)). In many-to-one matching with contracts, under IRC,
if there exist two stable mechanisms ψ and ψ′, then for every preference profile %D where
ψ(%D) , ψ
′(%D), there exists d ∈D such that ∅ , x(d,X
′) , x(d,X ′′) , ∅.
Proof. Consider any %D where ψ(%D) , ψ
′(%D). Let ψ(%D) = X
′ and ψ′(%D) = X
′′ . We
want to prove that there exists d ∈D such that ∅ , x(d,X ′) , x(d,X ′′) , ∅. Because X ′ , X ′′,
either X ′\X ′′ , ∅ or X ′′\X ′ , ∅. Suppose without loss of generality that X ′\X ′′ , ∅. If
there exist x ∈ X ′\X ′′ and x′ ∈ X ′′ such that d(x) = d(x′), we are done because x , x′.
Otherwise, for every d ∈ {d(x)}x∈X ′\X ′′ , it must be that x(d,X
′) ≻d x(d,X
′′) = ∅. For every
h ∈H such that x(h,X ′\X ′′) , ∅, we prove that Ch(X
′∪X ′′) = x(h,X ′′) and x(h,X ′′)\x(h,X ′) ,
∅. Suppose Ch(X
′ ∪X ′′) , x(h,X ′′) for some h. By IRC, Ch(X
′ ∪X ′′)∩ (X ′\X ′′) , ∅. It means
that (h,Ch(X
′ ∪ X ′′) ∩ (X ′\X ′′)) can block X ′′, which is a contradiction. Since Ch(X
′) =
x(h,X ′) , x(h,X ′′), IRC requires that x(h,X ′′)\x(h,X ′) , ∅. But this means that X ′′\X ′ , ∅
and x(h,X ′′\X ′) , ∅. By a similar argument as above, we can prove that Ch(X
′ ∪ X ′′) =
x(h,X ′), which is a contradiction since x(h,X ′′) , x(h,X ′).
Below we prove that when DOSM exists, though it may not be strategy-proof, doctor-
optimal stability implies that it is truncation-invariant. Because Theorem 2 actually holds
for truncation-invariant mechanisms, if a stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists, it
must coincide with DOSM.
Lemma 3. In many-to-one matching with contracts, under IRC, if the doctor-optimal stable
mechanism exists, it is truncation-invariant.
Proof. Let ψ denote the doctor-optimal stable mechanism. For all %D, all d ∈ D and all
x ∈ X with d(x) = d such that x ≻d ∅:
1. If x ≻d ψd(%D), we prove that ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) = ∅, where %
x
d is the truncation of %d at
x. Suppose ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) , ∅. Since ψ is individually rational, ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) %d x ≻d ψd(%D).
Since ψ(%xd ,%−d) is stable under (%
x
d ,%−d) and ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) %d x, ψ(%
x
d ,%−d) must be stable
under %D . But this contradicts the doctor-optimal stability of ψ(%D) under %D because
ψ(%D) does not Pareto dominate ψ(%
x
d ,%−d).
2. If ψd(%D) %d x, we prove that ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) %
x
d x. Since ψ(%D) is stable under %D
and ψd(%D) %d x, it must be stable under (%
x
d ,%−d). By the doctor-optimal stability of
ψ(%xd ,%−d) under (%
x
d ,%−d), ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) %
x
d ψd(%D). So ψd(%
x
d ,%−d) %
x
d x.
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Finally, we prove that non-wasteful matchings defined by HK are exactly not-strongly-
bidominated matchings within the set of individually rational matchings.
Lemma 4. In many-to-one matching with contracts, a matching X ′ is non-wasteful if and only
if it is not-strongly-bidominated among individually rational matchings.
Proof. For any two individually rational matchingsX ′ andX ′′ , we prove thatX ′ is strongly
bidominated by X ′′ if and only if X ′ ( X ′′ . X ′ is strongly bidominated by X ′′ if X ′′ strictly
Pareto dominates X ′ and for all d ∈ D, x(d,X ′′) ≻d x(d,X
′) implies x(d,X ′) = ∅. So for all
d ∈D with x(d,X ′) , ∅, x(d,X ′′) = x(d,X ′). It means that X ′ ( X ′′ .
Conversely, if X ′ ( X ′′, for all d ∈ D with x(d,X ′) , ∅, x(d,X ′′) = x(d,X ′) since each
doctor signs at most one contract. For all d ∈ D with x(d,X ′) = ∅ , x(d,X ′′), individual
rationality implies x(d,X ′′) ≻d x(d,X
′). So X ′′ strongly bidominates X ′ .
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose there exist two stable and strategy-proof mechanisms.
By Lemma 2, if they find matchings that are not welfare-equivalent, the matchings are
also not upper-equivalent. By Theorem 2, the two mechanisms coincide. By Lemma
3, when DOSM exists, it is truncation-invariant. Because Theorem 2 actually holds for
truncation-invariant mechanisms, when stable and strategy-proof mechanisms exist, they
coincide with DOSM. With Lemma 4, we can apply Corollary 3 to conclude that any non-
wasteful and strategy-proof mechanism is not strictly Pareto dominated by any other
individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism.
The second matching model we consider is the teacher reassignment model proposed
by Combe et al. (2020). In the model every teacher is initially matched to a school, and
teachers and schools have strict preferences over each other. The question is how to
rematch teachers and schools to improve their welfare. Combe et al. propose a class
of mechanisms called Block Exchange (BE) to find the set of desirable matchings. They
further recommend a subclass of BE called Teacher Optimal BE (TO-BE). Every TO-BE
is strategy-proof for teachers.19 In the one-to-one environment, TO-BE is single-valued,
and Combe et al. prove that TO-BE is the only strategy-proof mechanism among BE.
Proposition 4 (Combe et al. (2020)). In the one-to-one environment of the teacher reassign-
ment model, TO-BE is the unique strategy-proof mechanism in the class of BE.
We will not go into details about the model and mechanisms. Briefly, the one-to-one
environment includes equal numbers of teachers T and schools S. Every i ∈ S ∪ T has
19Because the preferences of schools are governed by policies, schools are not strategic agents.
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strict preferences %i over agents on the other side. A matching is a one-to-one mapping
µ : T → S. Let µ0 denote the initial matching. This environment can be accommodated
by our model where every teacher’s outside option is his initial assignment. BE is a gen-
eralization of TTC by taking preferences of both sides into account. Combe et al. prove
several lemmas to obtain Proposition 4. In our terminology, one of their lemmas, called
Lemma 5 below, proves that if any BE and TO-BE find different matchings for a prefer-
ence profile of teachers, thematchings are not upper-equivalent. Then Theorem 2 directly
implies Proposition 4. For brevity, we do not present the proof of Lemma 5. Combe et al.
need other lemmas and use a logic different from Theorem 2 to obtain Proposition 4.
Lemma 5 (Combe et al. (2020)). In the one-to-one environment of the teacher reassignment
model, let ψ be any selection of BE. For any preference profile of teachers %T , if x = TO-
BE(%T ) , ψ(%T ) = y, then there exists t ∈ T such that x(t) ≻t y(t) ≻t µ0(t).
4.4 Strategy-proofness and single-valued core
In a generalized object assignment model, So¨nmez (1999) proves that there exists an
IR, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism only if the core is single-valued and the
mechanism selects a core allocation when the core is nonempty. Ehlers (2018) extends
So¨nmez’s theorem by replacing the core with a superset called the individually-rational-
core (IR-core). The IR-core is more likely to be nonempty than the core. In this subsection
we show that the logic in Theorem 2 lies behind the theorems of So¨nmez and Ehlers. Let
Cir (%I ) denote the IR-core when the preference profile of agents in So¨nmez’s model is %I .
Proposition 5 (So¨nmez (1999); Ehlers (2018)). In Sonmez’s model, if there exists an IR,
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism ψ, then:
1. for all %I and all a,b ∈ Cir (%I ), a ∼i b for all i ∈ I ;
2. for all %I with Cir(%I ) , ∅, ψ(%I ) ∈ Cir(%I ).
To prove Proposition 5, we briefly introduce So¨nmez’s model and the two core notions.
In the model every agent is endowed with a finite set of indivisible objects. An allocation
assigns all objects to agents and every object is assigned to one agent. Let a(i) denote the
set of objects assigned to agent i in an allocation a. Let ω denote the initial allocation (i.e.,
the endowment). So¨nmez makes two assumptions on agents’ preferences:
• Assumption A: for all %i∈ Ri and all a ∈ A, a ∼i ω⇔ a(i) = ω(i).
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• Assumption B: for all %i∈ Ri and all a ∈ A(≻i ,ω), there exists %
′
i∈ Ri such that
A(%i ,a) =A(≻
′
i ,ω) =A(%
′
i ,a) and A(≻i ,a) =A(≻
′
i ,a).
For all T ⊂ I , define ω(T ) ≔ ∪i∈Tω(i). We say an allocation a weakly dominates an al-
location b via the coalition T ⊂ I under %I , denoted by a wdomT b, if a(i) ⊂ ω(T ) for all
i ∈ T , a %i b for all i ∈ T , and a ≻j b for some j ∈ T . The core under %I consists of all
undominated allocations, whereas the IR-core under %I is defined to be Cir(%I )≔ {b ∈ A :
∄T and a ∈ A with a wdomT b and a(i) = ω(i) for all i ∈ I\T }. The IR-core may be empty,
but when it is nonempty, every IR-core allocation is IR and Pareto efficient.
Clearly, So¨nmez’s model is a special case of ours by letting every agent’s outside option
be his endowment. So¨nmez’s two assumptions on preferences are stronger than NI and
Richness. Below we prove that the IR-core has the contraction-invariance property.
Lemma 6. In Sonmez’s model, for every %I∈ R with Cir (%I ) , ∅, every a ∈ Cir (%I ), every i,
and every contraction %′i of %i at a that satisfies Sonmez’s Assumption B, a ∈ Cir (%
′
i ,%−i).
Proof. Suppose a < Cir (%
′
i ,%−i). Then under (%
′
i ,%−i), there exist T ⊂ I and c ∈ A such that
c wdomT a and c(k) =ω(k) for all k ∈ I\T . So c %j a for all j ∈ T \{i}, c %
′
i a, and either c ≻j a
for some j ∈ T \{i}, or c ≻′i a. By Assumption B, c %
′
i a implies c %i a and c ≻
′
i a implies
c ≻i a. So under %I , we must have c wdomT a and c(k) = ω(k) for all k ∈ I\T . So a < Cir(%I ),
which is a contradiction.
Now suppose there exists an IR, Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism ψ. If
for all %I , Cir(%I ) = ∅, then the proposition holds trivially. Otherwise, we define R
∗ ≔
{%I∈ R : Cir(%I ) , ∅}, which is nonempty. Arbitrarily choose %
∗
I∈ R
∗ and a ∈ Cir(%
∗
I ), and
fix them. Then we construct a mechanism ψ′ according to the following steps:
1. Let ψ′(%∗I ) = a. So ψ
′(%∗I ) ∈ Cir (%
∗
I ).
2. For every i such that a ≻∗i c ≻
∗
i ω for some c ∈ A, let %
′
i be any contraction of %
∗
i at a
satisfying Assumption B. Let ψ′(%′i ,%
∗
−i) = a. By Lemma 6, ψ
′(%′i ,%
∗
−i) ∈ Cir(%
′
i ,%
∗
−i).
3. For every %I considered in step 2 and every i such that a ≻i c ≻i ω for some c ∈ A,
let %′i be any contraction of %i at a satisfying Assumption B. Let ψ
′(%′i ,%−i) = a. By
Lemma 6, ψ′(%′i ,%−i) ∈ Cir (%
′
i ,%−i).
4. Repeat the above operation until we cannot find a new preference profile. Since in
every step we contract a preference profile in the previous step, we must stop in
finite steps. Denote byR′ the set of preference profiles (including %∗I ) considered in
these steps. We know that for all %I∈ R
′, ψ′(%I ) = a ∈ Cir (%I ).
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5. For all %I∈ R\R
′, let ψ′(%I ) = ψ(%I ).
So in every preference profile, ψ′ either selects an IR-core allocation or coincides with
ψ. Thus, ψ′ is IR and Pareto efficient. The following lemma proves that ψ′ and ψ find dif-
ferent allocations for a preference profile only if the allocations are not upper-equivalent.
Lemma 7. For every %I∈ R with ψ
′(%I ) , ψ(%I ), there exists i such that ψ
′(%I ) ≻i ψ(%I ) ≻i ω.
Proof. For every %I∈ R such that ψ
′(%I ) , ψ(%I ), it must be that ψ
′(%I ) ∈ Cir (%I ). Since
both ψ′(%I ) and ψ(%I ) are IR and Pareto efficient, there must exist distinct i, j such that
ψ(%I ) ≻i ψ
′(%I ) and ψ
′(%I ) ≻j ψ(%I ). Suppose for all k ∈ I
′ ≔ {i ∈ I : ψ′(%I ) ≻i ψ(%I )},
ψ(%I ) ∼k ω. By Assumption A, ψk(%I ) = ω(k) for all k ∈ I
′. Then ψ(%I ) can weakly block
ψ′(%I ) via I\I
′ under %I , since all agents in I\I
′ weakly prefer ψ(%I ) to ψ
′(%I ), and i ∈ I\I
′
strictly prefers ψ(%I ) to ψ
′(%I ). But it contradicts the fact that ψ
′(%I ) ∈ Cir (%I ). So there
must exist k ∈ I ′ such that ψ′(%I ) ≻k ψ(%I ) ≻k ω.
Proof of Proposition 5. For every %I∈ R with ψ
′(%I ) , ψ(%I ), ψ
′(%I ) = a ∈ Cir(%I ). By
Lemma 7, there exists i such that a ≻i ψ(%I ) ≻i ω. Let %
′
i be any contraction of %i at a
satisfying Assumption B. So ψ′(%′i ,%−i ) = a ≻
′
i ω. Strategy-proofness of ψ requires that
ψ(%′i ,%−i ) ∼
′
i ω. So ψ
′(%′i ,%−i) , ψ(%
′
i ,%−i). Then, as in the proof of Theorem 2, this means
that we can iteratively contract the preference profile, which is a contradiction. So it must
be that ψ = ψ′. Note that ψ′ can be constructed for every %∗I∈ R
∗ and every a ∈ Cir (%
∗
I ). So
all allocations in Cir(%
∗
I ) are welfare-equivalent to ψ(%
∗
I ). It means that Cir (%
∗
I ) is essen-
tially single-valued and ψ selects an IR-core allocation when the IR-core is nonempty.
5 An alternative exposition of Theorem 1
In Section 2 we assume that there are finite deterministic allocations in our model.
This assumption simplifies our exposition and is relied upon by Theorem 2. It is also
satisfied by all applications presented in Section 4. Yet as we have explained in footnote
8, Theorem 1 holds no matter A is finite or infinite, as long as NI and Richness are as-
sumed and relevant definitions are adjusted to accommodate the measurability issue. For
deterministic mechanisms, Theorem 1 reduces to Alva and Manjunath’s (2019) theorem
where there is no assumption on the cardinality of A.
But there are environments where A is infinite and NI and Richness are violated. So
Theorem 1 is not applicable to those environments. After using an example to explain
these cases, we change our exposition and present an alternative version of Theorem 1. It
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conveys the same insight as Theorem 1 does, but it is applicable to more environments.
However, we will explain why the earlier exposition in Section 3 is desirable.
Recall that NI assumes that for every %i∈ Ri , Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅. Richness assumes that for
every %i∈ Ri and every a ∈ Ai(Ïi ,o
∗
i ), there exists %
′
i∈ Ri such that Ai(%i ,a) = Ai(%
′
i ,a) =
Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ) and Ai(∼
′
i ,o
∗
i ) = ∅. So o
∗
i is placed immediately below a in %
′
i , and the upper
contour set of a is invariant from %i to %
′
i . In the following example, we present a trans-
ferable utility environment where both NI and Richness are violated. Agents’ preferences
are continuous in transfers so that for every %i and every a ∈ Ai(%i ,o
∗
i ),Ai(%i ,a) is a closed
set whereas Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ) is an open set.
Example 2 (NI and Richness are violated when A is infinite). Consider the allocation of
a single object among finite agents of independent and private valuations. Let vi denote i’s
valuation, with the domain R+. An allocation a = (f
a, ta) consists of an assignment function
f a : I → {0,1} and a payment function ta : I → R+, where f
a
i = 1 if and only if i wins the object,
and tai is i’s payment. At most one agent wins the object, and every payment is nonnegative.
Because transfers are continuous, there are infinitely many allocations in this problem. Every
i’s utility in an allocation a is vi · f
a
i − t
a
i , and his preferences %i over allocations are induced by
utilities. Every i’s outside option o∗i is not bidding and paying zero. So for any a, a ≻i o
∗
i if and
only if f ai = 1 and t
a
i < vi , and if a ≻i o
∗
i , there exists b such that a ≻i b ≻i o
∗
i (by choosing f
b
i = 1
and tai < t
b
i < vi). Thus, for every %i , there does not exist a such that Ai(%i ,a) = Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ). So
Richness is violated. NI is also violated because for any a such that (f ai , t
a
i ) = (1,vi ), a ∼i o
∗
i .
The earlier definition of contraction-invariance requires invariant upper contour sets
in variations of agents’ preferences. When NI and Richness are violated, we change to
focus on strict upper contour sets. Specifically, we no longer assume NI and replace
Richness with the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Richness*). For every %i∈ Ri and every a ∈ Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ), there exists %
′
i∈ Ri
such that Ai(≻i ,a) =Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ).
Richness* requires that the strict upper contour set of a in %i become the set of strictly
acceptable allocations in %′i . In particular, o
∗
i is placed weakly above a in %
′
i . So now,
we call every such %′i a contraction of %i above a. Richness* is satisfied in Example 2,
because for every a ≻i o
∗
i , %
′
i could be induced by the valuation v
′
i = t
a
i , so that a ∼
′
i o
∗
i and
Ai(≻i ,a) =Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ). When A is finite, Richness implies Richness*.
20
20When A is finite, for any %i∈ Ri and any a ∈ Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ), as long as a is not one of the best allocations
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Now we call a mechanism ψ contraction-invariant* if for every %I , every i ∈ I , and
every a ∈ Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i ), if %
′
i is any contraction of %i above a, then
ψ(%I )[Ai (≻i ,a)] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (≻i ,a)].
Because Ai(≻i ,a) = Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ), we also have ψ(%I )[Ai (≻i ,a)] = ψ(%
′
i ,%−i)[Ai (≻
′
i ,o
∗
i )]. As be-
fore, strategy-proof mechanisms must be contraction-invariant*.
For all %i∈ Ri and all a ∈ A, we assume that A(%i ,a) and A(≻i ,a) are measurable.
A (random) allocation p is a probability measure. So p is IR if, for all i, p[A(%i ,o
∗
i )] =
1. Now we say an allocation p′ weakly stochastically dominates another allocation p for
agent i if, for all a ∈ A, p′[A(≻i ,a)] ≥ p[A(≻i ,a)]. Strict stochastic dominance and welfare-
equivalence are defined similarly, and they are extended to mechanisms as before. When
A is finite, these definitions are essentially the same as before.
In an IR allocation p, for any i, p[Ai ] = p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] + p[Ai(∼i ,o
∗
i )]. Without assuming
NI, it could happen that p[Ai ] , p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )]. So welfare comparison no longer implies
participation size comparison. Now we change to focus on p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] and call it the
welfare size of i in p. It is i’s probability of being better off than consuming outside option
in p. We say that an allocation p′ weakly welfare size dominates another allocation p if, for
all i, p′[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )] ≥ p[Ai(≻i ,o
∗
i )]. By this definition, weak stochastic dominance implies
weak welfare size dominance. Then we prove an alternative version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1*. Under Richness*, let ψ and ψ′ be two IR and strategy-proof mechanisms.
ψ′ weakly stochastically dominates ψ ⇐⇒ ψ′ weakly welfare size dominates ψ.
Proof. The ⇒ direction holds by the definitions of stochastic dominance and welfare
size dominance. So we only prove the ⇐ direction. Suppose ψ′ weakly welfare size
dominates ψ but does not weakly stochastically dominate ψ. It means that there exist
%I and i such that ψ
′(%I ) 
sd
i ψ(%I ). Because ψ and ψ
′ are IR, there exists a ∈ A(%i ,o
∗
i )
such that ψ(%I )[A(≻i ,a)] > ψ
′(%I )[A(≻i ,a)]. The fact that ψ
′ weakly welfare size domi-
nates ψ requires a ≻i ω. Under Richness*, let %
′
i be any contraction of %i above a. By
contraction-invariance*, ψ(%′i ,%−i)[Ai (≻
′
i ,o
∗
i )] > ψ
′(%′i ,%−i)[Ai (≻
′
i ,o
∗
i )]. But it contradicts
the assumption that ψ′ weakly welfare size dominates ψ.
in %i , there exists an allocation b such that Ai (%i ,b) = Ai(≻i ,a). Let %
′
i be any contraction of %i at b. Then
Ai(≻i ,a) =Ai(%i ,b) =Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ). So %
′
i is a contraction of %i above a. If a is one of the best allocations in %i ,
in the proof of Theorem 1*, we will never consider the contraction of %i above a. So the difference between
Richness and Richness* for such a is inessential.
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Theorem 1* is more concise than Theorem 1. We present Theorem 1 instead of Theo-
rem 1* in Section 3 for two reasons. First, because Theorem 1 extends Alva and Manju-
nath (2019), following AM’s exposition will be convenient for readers to quickly under-
stand our result and to see the relation with AM. Second, participation size seems to be
a better concept than welfare size. Participation size is a property of allocations that is
independent of agents’ preferences, while welfare size refers to agents’ preferences. But
we should point out that, when we focus on IR allocations and assume NI, participation
size coincides with welfare size. So Theorem 1 and Theorem 1* convey the same insight.
Finally, we clarify that because AM do not rely on contraction-invariance to obtain
their theorem, their richness assumption is more relaxed than our Richness and holds in
some environments where Richness fails. Recall that AM-richness assumes that, for every
%i∈ Ri and every a,b ∈ Ai with b ≻i a %i o
∗
i , there exists %
′
i∈ Ri such that b ≻
′
i o
∗
i ≻
′
i a, and
for all c ∈ Ai , c %
′
i o
∗
i ⇒ c ≻i a. In Example 2, for any b ≻i a %i o
∗
i , %
′
i can be induced by any
valuation v′i ∈ (t
b
i , t
a
i ), so that Ai(%i ,b) =Ai(%
′
i ,b) (Ai(≻
′
i ,o
∗
i ) (Ai(%
′
i ,a).
6 Concluding remark
Our theorems rely on the existence of outside options and agents’ freedom of arbitrar-
ily ranking outside options in their prefererences. When such freedom is restricted, the
second part of Theorem 1 does not hold because we can no longer recover an agent’s wel-
fare in a preference profile from his participation size in other preference profiles. Theo-
rem 2 neither holds because there may no longer exist a preference profile for which the
allocations find by any two strategy-proof mechanisms are upper-equivalent, and even
though such preference profiles exist, we cannot use contraction-invariance to connect
the allocations in different preference profiles. Our model is general enough to accom-
modate various environments. We have presented several applications in market design.
It will be interesting to find more applications in other fields of economics.
A Proof of Proposition 1
In the object assignment model where agents have strict preferences, for every agent
i, let O(≻i ,∅) denote the set of i’s acceptable objects when his preference relation is %i .
Below we define another invariance property of mechanisms that is weaker than strategy-
proofness. An IR mechanism is size-invariant if when an agent changes preferences with-
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out changing the set of acceptable objects, the total probability mass of acceptable objects
assigned to the agent is invariant.
Definition 9. An IR mechanism ψ is size-invariant if, for all ≻I∈ R, all i ∈ I , and all %
′
i∈
P\{%i} with O(≻
′
i ,∅) =O(≻i ,∅), ‖ψi(≻
′
i ,≻−i)‖ = ‖ψi(≻I )‖.
We will prove the following result in this appendix. Proposition 1 follows.
Lemma 8. In the object assignment model with strict preferences, suppose |I | ≥ 4, |O| ≥ 3,
and qo = 1 for all o ∈ O. Let ψ be an IR, truncation-invariant and size-invariant mechanism
that satisfies ETE and ExPE, and ψ′ be a size-invariant mechanism that strictly stochastically
dominates ψ. Then both ψ and ψ′ are strongly bidominated.
For any two mechanism ψ and ψ′ in Lemma 8, we proceed by a few steps to find the
allocations found by ψ for a few preference profiles. For one of them, the allocation found
by ψ is strongly bidominated, and ψ′ finds the same allocation for the preference profile.
So both ψ and ψ′ are strongly bidominated.
Specifically, let {1,2,3,4} denote four agents and {a,b,c} denote three objects. We con-
sider preference profiles in which the agents in {1,2,3,4} do not accept objects other than
{a,b,c}, and the other agents, if any, most prefer ∅. So we essentially consider problems
consisting of four agents and three objects.
We first prove a claim that will be repeatedly used.
Claim 1. If there exist I ′ ⊆ {1,2,3,4} and O′ ⊆ {a,b,c} such that every i ∈ I ′ prefers every
object in O′ to every object not in O′ and |I ′ | ≥ |O′|, then in every IR and ExPE allocation
p, for all o ∈O′, ‖po‖ = 1.
Proof. In any IR deterministic allocation p, if ‖po‖ = 0 for some o ∈ O
′, then there must
exist i ∈ I ′ who obtains an object that is worse than o, which means that p is not Pareto
efficient. So in any IR and Pareto efficient deterministic allocation, all objects in O′ must
be exhausted. Thus, in any IR and ExPE allocation p, all objects in O′ are exhausted.
By Claim 1, if an object in {a,b,c} is most preferred by some agent, the object must be
exhausted in any IR and ExPE allocation.
Step 1. We consider the following four preference profiles A, A′, A′′, and A′′′. We will
find allocations by ψ for them. For convenience, we omit unacceptable objects for each
agent and use ox to mean that the relevant agent obtains a probability share x of object o.
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A
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/3 a1/3 a1/3 c1
a0
b0
A′
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/3 a1/3 a1/3 c1
b2/3 a0
c0 b0
A′′
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/4 a1/4 a1/4 a1/4
b1/3 b1/3 b1/3
c1/3 c1/3 c1/3
A′′′
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/3 a1/3 a1/3 c11/12
b1/2 b1/2 a0
c1/24 c1/24 b0
We first derive the allocations found by ψ for A and A′. By Claim 1, a is exhausted in
all four preference profiles. In A, ExPE implies that 4 obtains c. ETE implies that 1, 2 and
3 each obtain 1/3a. Similarly, in A′, since 4 prefers c to a,b and 2 prefers a,b to c, ExPE
implies that 4 obtains c. By comparing A with A′, truncation-invariance implies that 2
obtains 1/3a in A′. Since a is exhausted, ETE implies that 1 and 3 each obtain 1/3a. Then,
ExPE implies that 2 obtains 2/3b.
To derive the allocation for A′′, we prove Claim 2.
Claim 2. In A′′ each agent obtains 1/4a.
Proof. Consider the four preference profiles A′′1 , A
′′
2 , A
′′
3 and A
′′
4 . Note that A
′′
4 = A
′′.
We only consider the assignment of a. By Claim 1, a is exhausted in all four preference
profiles. In A′′1 , by ETE, all agents obtain 1/4a. By truncation-invariance, in A
′′
2 , 1 obtains
1/4a. Then by ETE, each of the other agents also obtains 1/4a. By comparing A′′2 and A
′′
3 ,
truncation-invariance implies that 2 obtains 1/4a in A′′3 . By ETE, 1 also obtains 1/4a. By
ETE, 3 and 4 each obtain 1/4a. By comparing A′′3 and A
′′
4 , truncation-invariance implies
that 4 obtains 1/4a in A′′4 . By ETE, 1 and 2 each obtain 1/4a in A
′′
4 . So 3 obtains 1/4a.
A′′1
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/4 a1/4 a1/4 a1/4
b1/3 b1/3 b1/3
c1/3
A′′2
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/4 a1/4 a1/4 a1/4
b b1/2 c3/4
c
A′′3
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/4 a1/4 a1/4 a1/4
b b c3/4
c c b0
A′′4
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/4 a1/4 a1/4 a1/4
b b b
b c c
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In A′′, by Claim 1, all objects must be exhausted. By ETE, 1, 2 and 4 each obtain 1/3b
and 1/3c. Note that the total amount of objects assigned to 4 is 11/12.
By comparing A′′′ with A′, truncation-invariance implies that 1 obtains 1/3a in A′′′.
By ETE, 2 also obtains 1/3a. By ExPE, 4 never obtains a and b. So 3 obtains 1/3a. By
Claim 1, b is exhausted, and, by ETE, 1 and 2 each obtain 1/2b. By comparing A′′′ and
A′′, size-invariance implies that 4 obtains 11/12c in A′′′. So 1 and 2 each obtain 1/24c.
Step 2. We consider the following three preference profiles B, B′ , and B′′.
B
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/3 a1/3 a1/3 c11/12
b1/2 b1/2
c1/24 c1/24
B′
%1 %2 %3 %4
c1/3 c1/3 a11/12 c1/3
b1/2 b1/2
a1/24 a1/24
B′′
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/2 c1/2 a1/2 c1/2
b3/8 b3/8
c0 a0
By comparing Bwith A′′′, truncation-invariance implies that 4 obtains 11/12c in B. By
using similar arguments as in Claim 2, 1,2,3 each obtain 1/3a in B. By Claim 1, b and c
must be exhausted. So 1 and 2 each obtain 1/2b and 1/24c. By symmetric arguments, we
obtain the allocation for B′.
In B′′, since 1 prefers b to c and c to a, 2 prefers c to b and b to a, and b is acceptable
only to 1 and 2, ExPE implies that 1 never obtains c and 2 never obtains a. By using
similar arguments as in Claim 2, we can show that in B′′, 1 and 3 each obtain 1/2a, and
2 and 4 each obtain 1/2c. By comparing B′′ with B, size-invariance implies that the total
amount of objects that 2 obtains is 7/8. So 2 obtains 3/8b. Symmetrically, by comparing
B′′ with B′, size-invariance implies that 1 obtains 3/8b. So in the allocation for B′′, b is not
exhausted and the total amount of objects obtained by each of 1 and 2 is less than one.
This allocation is strongly bidominated by another allocation where 1 and 2 each obtain
1/2b. This means that ψ is strongly bidominated.
Suppose ψ′ is a size-invariant mechanism that strictly stochastically dominates ψ.
Since all objects are exhausted in ψ(B) and ψ(B′), it must be that ψ(B) = ψ′(B) and ψ(B′) =
ψ′(B′). Since ψ′(B′′) weakly stochastically dominates ψ(B′′), in ψ′(B′′), it must be that 1
and 3 each obtain 1/2a, and 2 and 4 each obtain 1/2c. So in ψ′(B′′), 1 never obtains c and
2 never obtains a. Because ψ(B) = ψ′(B) and ψ(B′) = ψ′(B′), by size-invariance of ψ′, 1 and
2 each obtain 3/8b in ψ′(B′′). So ψ′(B′′) = ψ(B′′). It means that ψ′ is strongly bidominated.
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B Proof of Lemma 1
We first define some notations. For each o ∈ O˜ ≔ O ∪ {∅} and each %i∈ B, we define
O(%i ,o)≔ {o
′ ∈O : o′ %i o}; O(≻i ,o) and O(∼i ,o) are similar. We also define O(Ïi ,∅)≔ {o ∈
O : o ≻i o
′ ≻i ∅ for some o
′ ∈ O}. Let O1(%i),O
2(%i), . . . ,O
Ki (%i) be the partition of O(≻i ,∅)
induced by ∼i . So each O
k(%i) is an indifference class for i, and we make the convention
that the objects in Ok(%i) are better than those in O
k+1(%i). We suppress the dependence
of Ki on %i . For every allocation p, O
′ ⊂O and i ∈ I , we define pi[O
′]≔
∑
o∈O′ pi,o.
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Fix a preference profile %I and two IR alloca-
tions p and p′ such that p is unbidominated and ‖p′‖ > ‖p‖. Define A ≔ {o ∈ O : ‖p′o‖ >
‖po‖}. Since ‖p
′‖ > ‖p‖, A is nonempty. For each o ∈ A, there exists i ∈ I such that p′i,o > pi,o.
Suppose p and p′ are upper-equivalent. It means that for all i ∈ I and all o ∈ O(Ïi ,∅),∑
o′%io
pi,o′ =
∑
o′%io
p′i,o′ . In other words, for all i and all 1 ≤ k < Ki , pi [O
k(%i)] = p
′
i[O
k(%i)].
We will proceed by a few steps to find a contradiction.
Step one: We generate a directed network according to the following procedure.
Step 1: Let each o ∈ A point to each i ∈ I such that p′i,o > pi,o. It means that we create
an edge o→ i. Denote by I1 the set of agents who are pointed by an object in A. We have
explained that I1 is nonempty.
Let each i ∈ I1 point to each o
′ ∈ O such that (1) p′i,o′ < pi,o′ and (2) there exists o ∈ A
such that o→ i and o %i o
′. It means that we create an edge i → o′. Denote by O1 the set
of objects pointed by agents in I1. It may happen that O1 ∩A , ∅.
Step 2: Let each o ∈O1 point to each i ∈ I , if o has not pointed to i, such that p
′
i,o > pi,o.
Denote the set of such i by I2. It may happen that I2∩ I1 , ∅. Let each i ∈ I2 point to each
o′ ∈ O, if i has not pointed to o′, such that (1) p′i,o′ < pi,o′ and (2) there exists o ∈ A∪O1
such that o→ i and o %i o
′. Denote the set of such o′ by O2.
. . .
Step k ≥ 3: Let each o ∈ Ok−1 point to each i ∈ I , if o has not pointed to i, such that
p′i,o > pi,o. Denote the set of such i by Ik . Let each i ∈ Ik point to each o
′ ∈ O, if i has not
pointed to o′, such that (1) p′i,o′ < pi,o′ and (2) there exists o ∈ A∪ [∪
k−1
ℓ=1Oℓ] such that o→ i
and o %i o
′. Denote the set of such o′ by Ok .
Stop: The procedure stops when there are no new edges created in some step.
Since there are finite agents and finite objects, the procedure must stop in finite steps.
In the generated directed network, denote the set of agents by I ′ and the set of objects by
O′. So A ⊆ O′. From the procedure we know that for every i ∈ I ′, there exists an object
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o ∈ A and a directed path from o to i, written as
o→ i1 → o1 → i2 → o2→ ·· · → in → on → i,
such that, for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, p′iℓ ,oℓ−1 > piℓ ,oℓ−1, p
′
iℓ,oℓ
< piℓ,oℓ , and oℓ−1 %iℓ oℓ (o0 = o), and
p′i,on > pi,on . If n = 0, o directly points to i.
Step two: We prove that for all i ∈ I ′, ‖pi‖ = 1. Suppose for some i ∈ I
′, ‖pi‖ < 1.
Consider the above path from some o ∈ A to i. Given that p and p′ are IR, for all ℓ ∈
{1, . . . ,n}, both oℓ−1 and oℓ are acceptable to iℓ because p
′
iℓ,oℓ−1
> 0 and piℓ,oℓ > 0, and on
is acceptable to i because p′i,on > 0. Since ‖po‖ < ‖p
′
o‖, it must be that ‖po‖ < qo. So for a
sufficiently small ǫ > 0, in the above path if we increase every piℓ,oℓ−1 by ǫ, decrease every
piℓ,oℓ by ǫ, increase pi,on by ǫ, and do not change the other probabilities, then we obtain a
new allocation that bidominates p, contradicting the assumption that p is unbidominated.
Step three: We prove that O\O′ , ∅. The fact that ‖pi‖ = 1 for all i ∈ I
′ implies
that
∑
i∈I ′ ‖pi‖ ≥
∑
i∈I ′ ‖p
′
i‖. Because ‖p‖ < ‖p
′‖, we must have I\I ′ , ∅ and
∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖pi‖ <∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖p
′
i‖. For every i ∈ I\I
′ and every o ∈ O′, because o does not point to i, pi,o ≥ p
′
i,o. If
O′ =O, we should have
∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖pi‖ ≥
∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖p
′
i‖, which is a contradiction.
Step four: We prove that there exists o ∈ O\O′ such that o ∈ A ⊆ O′, which will be a
contradiction. For every i ∈ I ′, let oi be one of the best objects in O′ such that oi → i. That
is, there does not exist o′ ∈O′ such that o′ ≻i o
i and o′ → i. For every o ∈ O\O′, if o is not
acceptable to i, then pi,o = p
′
i,o = 0, whereas if o is acceptable to i, then either o
i %i o or
o ≻i o
i . If oi %i o, because i does not point to o, it must be that pi,o ≤ p
′
i,o. So,
(1)
∑
o∈O\O′ :oi%io
pi,o ≤
∑
o∈O\O′ :oi%io
p′i,o.
If o ≻i o
i , suppose o ∈ Ok(%i) for some k. It must be that k < Ki . For all o
′ ∈ O′ ∩Ok(%i),
since o′ does not point to i (because o′ ≻i o
i), we must have pi,o′ ≥ p
′
i,o′ . So
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
pi,o′ ≥
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
p′i,o′ .
Recall that we have assumed that pi[O
k(%i)] = p
′
i[O
k(%i)], which is equivalent to
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
pi,o′ +
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩(O\O′ )
pi,o′ =
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
p′i,o′ +
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩(O\O′ )
p′i,o′ .
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Since
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
pi,o′ ≥
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩O′
p′i,o′ , we obtain
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩(O\O′ )
pi,o′ ≤
∑
o′∈Ok (%i )∩(O\O′ )
p′i,o′ .
Summarizing over all o′ ∈Ok(%i)∩ (O\O
′) for all k such that o′ ≻i o
i , we obtain
(2)
∑
o′∈O\O′ :o′≻ioi
pi,o′ ≤
∑
o′∈O\O′ :o′≻ioi
p′i,o′ .
Summarizing (1) and (2), we obtain
∑
o′∈O\O′
pi,o′ ≤
∑
o′∈O\O′
p′i,o′ .
Summarizing over all i ∈ I ′, we obtain
(3)
∑
i∈I ′
∑
o′∈O\O′
pi,o′ ≤
∑
i∈I ′
∑
o′∈O\O′
p′i,o′ .
We have proved that
∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖pi‖ <
∑
i∈I\I ′ ‖p
′
i‖, which is equivalent to
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O
pi,o <
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O
p′i,o,
or, ∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O′
pi,o +
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O\O′
pi,o <
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O′
p′i,o +
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O\O′
p′i,o.
For every i ∈ I\I ′ and every o ∈O′, because o does not point to i, pi,o ≥ p
′
i,o. So
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O′
pi,o ≥
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O′
p′i,o.
So we must have
(4)
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O\O′
pi,o <
∑
i∈I\I ′
∑
o∈O\O′
p′i,o.
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Summarizing (3) and (4), we obtain
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O\O′
pi,o <
∑
i∈I
∑
o∈O\O′
p′i,o,
or, ∑
o∈O\O′
‖po‖ <
∑
o∈O\O′
‖p′o‖.
So there exists o ∈O\O′ such that ‖po‖ < ‖p
′
o‖. But this means that o ∈ A ⊆O
′, which is
a contradiction.
C Examples for Section 4.2
In Example 3, we construct a mechanism that strictly size dominates PS. The mecha-
nism is not truncation-invariant, but it is ordinally efficient and envy-free.
Example 3 (PS is strictly size dominated by an ordinally efficient and envy-free mecha-
nism). There are four agents 1,2,3,4 and four objects a,b,c,d. Consider a mechanism ψ that
is different from PS in the preference profile %I in the following table, and coincides with PS in
the other preference profiles. In the table we use ox to mean that the relevant agent obtains a
probability share x of object o. Unacceptable objects are omitted from agents’ preference lists.
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/2 a1/2 b1/2 b1/2
c1/4 c1/4 c1/4 c1/4
d1/4 d1/4
a0 a0
(a) PS(%I )
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/2 a1/2 b1/2 b1/2
c1/2 c1/2 c0 c0
d1/2 d1/2
a0 a0
(b) ψ(%I )
It is easy to see that ψ(%I ) is ordinally efficient and envy-free. So ψ is an ordinally efficient
and envy-free mechanism. From PS(%I ) to ψ(%I ), 1 and 2 obtain more amounts of objects, and
3 and 4 obtain the same amounts of objects as before. So ψ strictly size dominates PS. But
ψ is not truncation-invariant. If 3 truncates preferences at c in %I , he will obtain the lottery
(1/2b,1/4c), instead of the lottery (1/2b) that is required by truncation-invariance.
In Example 4, we construct an IR and unbidominatedmechanism that is not truncation-
invariant but is strictly size dominated by PS.
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Example 4 (An IR and unbidominated mechanism is strictly size dominated by PS). There
are four agents 1,2,3,4 and four objects a,b,c,d. Consider a mechanism ψ that is different
from PS in the preference profile %I in the following table, and coincides with PS in the other
preference profiles. In the table we use ox to mean that the relevant agent obtains a probability
share x of object o. Unacceptable objects are omitted from agents’ preference lists.
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/2 a1/2 b1/2 b1/2
c1/4 c1/4 c1/4 c1/4
d1/4 d1/4
a0 a0
(a) PS(%I )
%1 %2 %3 %4
a1/2 a1/2 b1/2 b1/2
c0 c0 c1/2 c1/2
d0 d0
a0 a0
(b) ψ(%I )
Because ψ(%I ) is non-wasteful, ψ is unbidominated. From ψ(%I ) to PS(%I ), 1 and 2 obtain
more amounts of objects, and 3 and 4 obtain the same amounts of objects as before. So ψ is
strictly size dominated by PS. But ψ is not truncation-invariant. If 3 truncates preferences at c
in %I , he will obtain the lottery (1/2b,1/4c), instead of the lottery (1/2b,1/2c) that is required
by truncation-invariance.
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